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R E S U M E N
Mi tesis se centra en el Comercio Internacional y Macroeconomía Aplicada. Mi
investigación actual se ocupa de los efectos de las políticas comerciales y de innovación
sobre las decisiones de las empresas y su impacto en el bienestar de la economía.
El primer capítulo, titulado “Trade and Process Innovation: Extensive and Intensive Margin”,
considera un modelo de comercio con empresas heterogéneas que no sólo deciden cuándo
y cuánto exportar sino también cuándo y cuánto innovar. Aunque la literatura siempre
ha reconocido la interdependencia entre la innovación y el comercio, hasta ahora no
ha analizado el impacto de la liberalización del comercio sobre la productividad y el
bienestar en un modelo que incorpore los márgenes extensivos e intensivos tanto del
comercio como de la innovación. El objetivo principal de este capítulo es mostrar que
la introducción de estos márgenes diferentes es clave para entender el impacto de la
liberalización del comercio.
Distintos equilibrios pueden darse en función de los costes relativos del comercio y
la innovación. En una economía con costes comerciales bajos en relación con los costes
de la innovación, empresas con una productividad media exportan pero no innovan,
mientras que en una economía con costes comerciales altos en relación con los costes
de innovación, las empresas con una productividad media innovan pero no exportan. En
un tercer equilibrio, en medio de los otros dos, algunas empresas con una productividad
media exportan e innovan, mientras que otras ni exportan ni innovan.
En el segundo capítulo, titulado “Trade, Process Innovation and Productivity: A
Quantitative Analysis of Europe”, se muestra que los distintos equilibrios teóricos descritos
en el primer capítulo son cuantitativamente posibles a través de una calibración del
modelo para cinco países europeos (Francia , Alemania, Italia, España y Reino Unido),
utilizando los datos a nivel de empresas del proyecto European Firms in a Global
Economy (EFIGE).
A continuación, muestro que el impacto de la liberalización del comercio sobre la
productividad agregada y el bienestar depende crucialmente del equilibrio en el que
se encuentra la economía. El primer ejercicio cuantitativo consiste en estimar el efecto
de una reducción de los costes comerciales variables sobre la productividad agregada y
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el bienestar. Atkeson y Burstein (2010) encuentran que permitir a las empresas innovar
no cambia los beneficios del comercio, ya que la mayor intensidad en la innovación
de las empresas exportadoras se compensa con la disminución de la intensidad en la
innovación de las empresas no exportadoras. A pesar de encontrar resultados similares
generalmente, en las economías donde el comercio es caro en relación con la innovación,
la disminución de los costes del comercio variables hace que sea más difícil para las
empresas nacionales innovar. En comparación con Atkeson y Burstein (2010), este efecto
negativo proveniente del margen extensivo de la innovación puede dar lugar a pérdidas
de bienestar. El segundo ejercicio cuantitativo se centra en los efectos sobre el bienestar de
la reducción de los costes fijos del comercio o la innovación. Encuentro que una reducción
de los costes fijos de comercio no siempre tiene un efecto positivo. En particular, en una
economía en la que muchas empresas exportan, pero pocas empresas innovan, al reducir
los costes fijos de comercio, aumenta el número de exportadores, y puede hacer que la
innovación sea más cara, lo que disminuye la productividad agregada.
Estos resultados subrayan la importancia de contar con un modelo que analiza
conjuntamente los márgenes extensivos e intensivos de comercio y de la innovación. No
hacerlo no sólo daría lugar a una estructura teórica menos rica, sino que también nos
impediría evaluar correctamente el impacto de diferentes políticas destinadas a fomentar
el comercio y la innovación.
En el tercer capítulo, titulado “Understanding Competitiveness” y conjunto con Rubén
Segura Cayuela, se analizan los factores que impulsan la evolución de los costes laborales
totales unitarios (CLU), el principal indicador de la competitividad europea, en Francia,
Alemania, Italia y España. Utilizando datos a nivel de empresas, calculamos un cambio
ponderado de los CLU agregados entre 2002 y 2007, y lo descomponemos en tres
elementos principales: el primero captura los cambios a nivel de empresa de los costes
laborales unitarios, manteniendo las cuotas iniciales del mercado interno de las empresas
constante; el segundo cuantifica la reasignación de cuotas de mercado en la economía
nacional, manteniendo los costes laborales unitarios iniciales constantes; y el tercero mide
la interacción entre las dos primeros elementos. Los resultados indican que la evolución
de los CLU agregados no se debe a la evolución de los CLU a nivel de empresa, y por lo
tanto falla en capturar adecuadamente la heterogeneidad existente a nivel de empresa. En
cambio, la evolución de los CLU agregados es impulsada por la reasignación de recursos
entre las empresas de la economía.
Motivados por el importante papel de la reasignación de recursos para explicar la
evolución de los CLU agregados, aplicamos la metodología de Hsieh y Klenow (2009) para
6
cuantificar la medida en que las diferencias de productividad en Europa se deben a una
asignación ineficiente de los recursos. Como resultado de las distorsiones que afectan la
producción, las empresas producen diferentes cantidades que lo dictaría su productividad.
Una asignación eficiente de los recursos aumentaría la TFP manufacturera agregada en
2008 un 22, 7% en Francia, 27, 9% en Alemania, 43, 5% en Italia y 28, 2% en España.
El análisis empírico de los costes laborales unitarios como medida competitividad, pone
de manifiesto la necesidad de utilizar datos microeconómicos para entender los factores
que impulsan la evolución de los agregados macroeconómicos.
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A B S T R A C T
My Dissertation focuses on International Trade and Applied Macroeconomics. My current
research deals with the effects of trade and innovation policies on firms’ decisions and
their impact on the welfare of the economy.
The first chapter, entitled “Trade and Process Innovation: Extensive and Intensive Margin”,
considers a trade model with heterogeneous firms that decide not just whether and how
much to export but also whether and how much to innovate. While the literature has long
recognized the interdependence between innovation and trade, it has so far not analyzed
the impact of trade liberalization on productivity and welfare in a model that incorporates
both the extensive and intensive margins of both trade and innovation. The main point of
the chapter is to show that introducing these different margins is key for understanding
the impact of trade liberalization.
Different equilibria may arise, depending on the relative costs of trade and innovation.
In an economy with trade costs that are low relative to innovation costs, medium
productivity firms export without innovating, whereas in an economy with trade costs
that are high relative to innovation costs, medium productivity firms innovate without
exporting. In a third equilibrium, in between the other two, some medium productivity
firms export and innovate, whereas others neither export nor innovate.
In the second chapter, entitled “Trade, Process Innovation and Productivity: A Quantitative
Analysis of Europe”, I show that the theoretical equilibria discussed in the first chapter
are quantitatively plausible by calibrating the model to five European countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom) using the firm-level data set European Firms
in a Global Economy (EFIGE).
I then show that the impact of trade liberalization on aggregate productivity and
welfare depends crucially on the equilibrium the economy is in. A first quantitative
exercise consists of estimating the effect of a reduction in variable trade costs on aggregate
productivity and welfare. Atkeson and Burstein (2010) find that allowing for firms to
innovate does not change the gains from trade, since the increased innovation intensity of
the exporting firms is offset by the decreased innovation intensity of non-exporting firms.
Although I find overall similar results, in economies where trade is expensive relative to
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innovation, a drop in variable trade costs makes it harder for domestic firms to innovate.
Compared to Atkeson and Burstein (2010), this negative effect coming from the extensive
margin of innovation may lead to welfare losses. A second quantitative exercise focuses
on the welfare effects of lowering the fixed costs of trade or innovation. I find that a drop
in fixed trade costs need not always have a positive effect. Indeed, in an economy in which
many firms export, but few firms innovate, lowering the fixed costs of trade, by increasing
the number of exporters, may make innovating more expensive, thus lowering aggregate
productivity.
These findings stress the importance of having a model that jointly analyzes the
extensive and intensive margins of both trade and innovation. Not doing so would not
just result in a less rich theoretical structure, it would also keep us from correctly assessing
the impact of different policies aimed at fomenting trade and innovation.
In the third chapter, entitled “Understanding Competitiveness” and joint with Rubén
Segura Cayuela, we analyze the factors that drive the evolution of the aggregate Unit
Labor Costs(ULC), the main European competitiveness indicator, in France, Germany,
Italy and Spain. Using firm level data we calculate a weighted change of the aggregate
ULC between 2002 and 2007, and decompose it into three main elements: the first
captures changes in firm-level unit labor costs, keeping the initial domestic market shares
of firms constant; the second quantifies the reallocation of market shares within the
domestic economy, keeping the initial unit labor costs constant; and the third measures the
interaction between the first two. The results suggest that the evolution of the aggregate
ULC is not driven by the evolution of the firm level ULC, and therefore fails at capturing
adequately the heterogeneity existent at the firm level. Instead, the evolution of the ULC
is driven by the reallocation of resources among the firms of the economy.
Motivated by the significant role of the reallocation of resources to explain the evolution
of the aggregate ULC, we apply the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to quantify
how much of the differences in productivity in Europe is due to an inefficient allocation
of resources. As a result of distortions that affect production, firms produce different
amounts that what would be dictated by their productivity. An efficient allocation of
resources would boost aggregate manufacturing TFP in 2008 by 22.7% in France, 27.9% in
Germany, 43.5% in Italy and 28.2% in Spain.
The empirical analysis of the unit labor costs as a competitiveness measure, reveals the
need to use microeconomic data to understand the driving factors behind the evolution
of macroeconomic aggregates.
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1
T R A D E A N D P R O C E S S I N N O VAT I O N : E X T E N S I V E A N D
I N T E N S I V E M A R G I N
Abstract. This paper proposes a trade model with heterogeneous firms that decide not just
whether and how much to export but also whether and how much to innovate, where
innovation reflects the ability of firms to increase their productivity. Incorporating both
the extensive and intensive margins of trade and innovation leads to different equilibria.
Depending on how costly trade is relative to innovation, medium-productivity firms may
either export without innovating, innovate without exporting, do both or do neither.
The impact of trade on aggregate productivity and welfare depends crucially on the
firms’ typology distribution in equilibrium, and which distribution arises depends on
the cost-benefit ratio of innovation and the exporting cost.
11

1.1 introduction
1.1 introduction
There is substantial heterogeneity across firms in both process innovation and export
activities. Some firms neither innovate nor export, others both innovate and export, and
still others may do only one of the activities. In addition, within these different groups of
firms, the intensity of both activities also differs across firms. While the literature has long
recognized the interdependence between process innovation and trade, it has so far not
analyzed the impact of trade liberalization on productivity and welfare in a model that
incorporates both the extensive and the intensive margins of both trade and innovation.
The aim of the paper is to show that introducing these different margins is key
for understanding the impact of trade liberalization. Different equilibria may arise,
depending on the relative costs of trade and innovation. After discussing the properties
of each of those equilibria, I show theoretically that the impact of opening up to trade
depends crucially on the equilibrium the economy is in the open economy. For example,
I show that if trade is relatively more expensive than process innovation, opening up to
trade implies a decrease in the number of innovators in the economy, while if trade is
relatively less expensive than innovation, opening up to trade leads to an increase in the
number of innovators in the economy.
The paper proposes a trade model with heterogeneous firms in the spirit of Melitz
(2003) with a basic difference: once a firm learns about its productivity, it can decide to
spend resources on process innovation to lower its marginal costs. Process innovation1 is a
costly activity that involves both fixed and variable costs, hence firms decide whether and
how much to innovate. This is key to explore how trade liberalization affects the extensive
and intensive margins of trade and innovation. The model is rich enough to explore the
interdependence between the innovation and export decisions, and yet tractable enough
to aggregate up from firm level decisions and analyze how aggregate productivity and
welfare respond to changes in trade and innovation policies.
Three different equilibria may arise, depending on how costly trade is relative to
innovation. In all three equilibria, high-productivity firms always export and innovate,
while low-productivity firms never export or innovate. What differs across equilibria
is the behavior of medium-productivity firms. In the low cost innovation equilibrium,
1 Process innovation in the literature is defined as the adoption of a production technology which is
significantly improved;
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trade is relatively costly compared to innovation, so that medium-productivity firms
innovate but do not export. In the low cost trade equilibrium, trade costs are relatively low
compared to innovation, so that medium-productivity firms export but do not innovate.
In between these two extremes, there is the intermediate equilibrium, characterized by
medium-productivity firms engaging in either both activities or none of them. Depending
on which equilibrium the economy is in, the theory illustrates that the effect of trade
liberalization on aggregate productivity and welfare may be very different.
A key contribution of my work is that it joins the two branches of the literature on
trade and process innovation. On the one hand, there is the literature that focuses on
how firms make joint decisions on exporting and innovating. Yeaple (2005) and Bustos
(2011) consider models in which there is a binary technology choice, and highlight how
firms decide to both enter the export market and adopt the new technology. The cost
of innovation is therefore modeled as a fixed cost. Costantini and Melitz (2008) extend
this type of joint decision to a dynamic framework where firms face both idiosyncratic
uncertainty and sunk costs for both exporting and technology adoption. On the other
hand, there is the literature that focuses on examining the impact of trade on the intensity
of innovation. Vannoorenberghe (2008) and Rubini (2011) consider models in which
firm productivity is endogenously determined through innovation, and highlight that
innovation is affected by the existence of foreign markets. Closely related to these is the
work of Atkeson and Burstein (2010). They propose a dynamic trade model to include
a process innovation decision by incumbent firms following Griliches (1979) model of
knowledge capital.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I present the model of the closed
economy, where firms only take decisions on innovation. In Section 1.3, I present the
model of the open economy and explore the equilibria determined by the interaction
between the exporting and innovation choices creates. In Section 1.4, I discuss the
implication on aggregate productivity. And Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 closed economy
The model is based on the monopolistic competition framework proposed by Melitz (2003)
which I expand to allow firms to engage in process innovation.
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1.2.1 Demand
There is a continuum of consumers of measure L. Given the set Ω of varieties supplied,
the consumer’s preferences are represented by the standard C.E.S. utility function
[∫
ω∈Ω
qρ(ω)dω
] 1
ρ
,
where q(ω) denotes the quantity consumed of variety ω, and σ = 11−ρ > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution across varieties. The market is subject to the expenditure-income
constraint:∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dω = R,
where R is the total revenues obtained.
Standard utility maximization implies that the demand for each individual variety is:
q(ω) = [p(ω)]−σ
R
P1−σ
, (1.1)
where p(ω) is the price of each variety ω and P =
[∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ denotes the
price index of the economy.
1.2.2 Supply
There is a continuum of firms, each producing a different variety ω. Each firm draws its
productivity ϕ from a distribution G (ϕ) with support (0,∞) after paying a labor sunk
cost of entry fE. Since a firm is characterized by its productivity ϕ, it is equivalent to talk
about variety ω or productivity ϕ.
Production requires only labor, which is inelastically supplied at the aggregate level L,
and therefore can be taken as an index of country’s size. In contrast to the Melitz model
where firms use a constant returns to scale production technology, firms can affect their
marginal cost through process innovation. To enter the economy, a firm needs fD > 0
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labor units. Therefore, to produce output q (ϕ) , a firm requires l (ϕ) labor units:
l (ϕ) = fD + c (z(ϕ)) +
q(ϕ)
ϕ
1
(1+ z(ϕ))
1
σ−1
,
where z(ϕ) is a measure of the productivity increase from innovation that has an
associated cost function c (z(ϕ)).
The cost function of the innovation follows Klette and Kortum (2004), Lentz and
Mortensen (2008), and Stähler et al. (2007), therefore c(z) is a strictly convex cost function,
twice differentiable with c(0) = 0. Firms pay a fixed cost that can be attributed to the
acquisition and implementation of the technology, plus a variable cost that depends
directly on the process innovation performed by each firm. Hence, the cost function c (z)
is defined as
c(z(ϕ)) =
 z(ϕ)α+1 + fI if z(ϕ) > 0,0 if z(ϕ) = 0,
where fI is the fixed cost required to implement the process innovation, and α > 0
measures the rate at which the marginal cost of the innovation increases.
The fixed cost of innovation provides a partition in the firms, there will be innovators
and non-innovators in the economy, allowing to study changes along the extensive margin
of innovation. The variable costs explain differences among the innovation performed by
firms — the higher the level of innovation, the higher the cost— allowing to study changes
along the intensive margin of innovation.
Even though it can be argued that the cost of innovation can be simplified by imposing
a linear variable cost, the existence of convex innovation costs is a standard feature in
the literature because it ensures that innovation is finite. Another simplification would
be to have either a fixed cost or a variable cost but not both. Nevertheless, maintaining a
flexible cost function is important. For example, Vannoorenberghe (2008) assumes away
a fixed innovation cost, which implies that all firms engage in process innovation. This
eliminates the possibility of studying the interaction between the export and innovation
decisions along the extensive margin, which is one of the purposes of this paper.
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1.2.3 Firm’s Problem
Figure 1.1 represents the timing of the firm’s problem. 2 In a first stage, as in Melitz
(2003), entering the market means paying a labor sunk cost fE in order to get a draw
of the productivity parameter ϕ. In the second stage, with the knowledge of their own
productivity, firms decide how much to innovate. Since innovation requires paying a labor
fixed cost, fI, there will be two types of firms in the closed economy: Type D firms are
active in the market and do not perform innovation and; and Type DI firms are those
active in the market that innovate; Finally, in the third stage, firms choose prices. I solve
the firms problem through backward induction.
Enter Market
−fD
Exit Market
−fE
−fI Innovate
Do Not Innovate
1
Figure 1.1: Timing in the Closed Economy
optimal pricing rule . In the last stage of the problem the firm sets its optimal
price, given its innovation decision and the market conditions which are summarized by
the price index P and R.
max
p(ϕ)
p (ϕ)q (ϕ) − fD −
q (ϕ)
ϕ
[
(1+ z(ϕ))
1
σ−1
] − c (z(ϕ))
The corresponding first order condition is
p (ϕ) =
(
σ
σ− 1
)
1
ϕ
· 1
(1+ z(ϕ))
1
σ−1
∀ z(ϕ). (1.2)
optimal innovation decision. The optimal innovation rule is obtained from the
first order condition of the maximization of pi (ϕ) = [p(ϕ)q(ϕ) − l(ϕ)] with respect to
2 As in Melitz (2003), the dynamics are trivial, since firms make all decisions at birth.
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z(ϕ), provided that the firm makes higher profits by innovating than by choosing not to
innovate. This gives
z(ϕ) =

[(
1
α+1
) p(ϕ)q(ϕ)
σ
] 1
α
if piDI(ϕ) > piD(ϕ),
0 if piDI(ϕ) < piD(ϕ),
(1.3)
where 1α is the parameter that shapes the optimal innovation function and tells us how
innovation rises with size, where I take the productivity parameter ϕσ−1 to be the
indicator of size. If the function is linear (α = 1), then innovation rises proportionately
with size, however, if the function is concave (α > 1), then the amount of innovation
performed will rise less than proportionally with size, and if the function is convex
(0 < α < 1) the amount of innovation performed will increase more than proportionally
with the productivity.
Firms will choose the option that yields the highest profits.
− Profits of a non-innovator firm (Type D):
piD =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 − fD.
− Profits of an innovator firm (Type DI):
piDI =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 (1+ z (ϕ)) − fD − c (z (ϕ)) .
1.2.4 Equilibrium in a Closed Economy
In Autarky only the most productive firms will innovate. The conditions of entry in the
domestic market plus the innovation condition allow to solve for the different productivity
cutoffs in the closed economy equilibrium.
The Zero Profit Condition (ZCP) piD
(
ϕ∗D
)
= 0, so that:
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 =
fD(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) . (1.4)
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The Innovation Profit Condition (IPC) determines the productivity cutoff ϕ∗DI which
is the productivity of the firm indifferent between innovating or not, i.e. piDI (ϕDI) =
piD (ϕDI)
(ϕ∗DI)
σ−1 =
(
fI
α
) α
α+1 · (α+ 1)(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) . (1.5)
By combining equations Equation 1.4 and Equation 1.5 we have the relation between
the innovation cutoff and the entry cutoff in terms of the fixed cost to produce, the fixed
cost to innovate and the parameters of the innovation:
(ϕ∗DI)
σ−1 =
(
fI
α
) α
α+1 · (α+ 1)
fD
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 , (1.6)
where
(
fI
α
) α
α+1 ·(α+1)
fD
can be interpreted as the ratio between the innovation costs and the
operating costs. The numerator is composed by the sunk cost of innovation, whose effect
is determined by the shape of the innovation and the elasticity 3 of the variable costs to
innovate, while the denominator is simply the operating costs that every firm must incur
into in order to actively participate in the market.
Proposition 1. The economy is in equilibrium and ϕ∗DI > ϕ
∗
D, if the following parameter
restriction holds(
fI
α
) α
α+1
· (α+ 1) > fD
Proof. Selection into innovation (ϕ∗DI > ϕ
∗
D) requires innovation costs to be high enough
relative to production costs. Equations Equation 1.4 and Equation 1.5 along with the
Free Entry (FE) condition, which requires that the sunk entry cost equals the present
value of expected profits:[∫ϕ∗DI
ϕ∗D
piD (ϕ)dG (ϕ) +
∫∞
ϕ∗DI
piDI (ϕ)dG (ϕ)
]
= δfE (1.7)
3 εC =
zcdotc′V(z)
cV(z)
= (α+ 1)
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uniquely determine the equilibrium price (P) , the number of firms (M) , and the
distribution of active firms productivity in the economy along with the productivity
cutoffs ϕ∗DI, and ϕ
∗
D. See Appendix A.1 for a formal proof.
Finally, notice that the cutoff productivity level in this economy is higher compared
to the one found in Melitz (2003) where firms have no choice to invest in a productivity
enhancing technology (See Appendix for proof). The reasoning behind this result is that
the ability of some firms to invest in a cost reducing technology enables them to have
more market shares than they would without the presence of innovation. Logically, those
market shares are ’stolen’ from the less productive firms of the economy.
1.3 open economy
1.3.1 Set-up
I now examine the impact of trade in a world that is composed of countries whose
economies are of the type that was previously described. I assume that the economy
under study can trade with n > 1 other identical countries, that is, the world is then
comprised of n + 1 symmetric countries. The symmetry of both countries ensures that
factor price equalization holds, countries have a common wage which can be still taken
as a numerary and they share the same aggregate variables.
I denote the source country by i and the destination country by j, where i, j = 1, 2, ...,
n+ 1. To enter country j, firm i needs fij > 0 labor units and there are iceberg trade cost,
so that τij > 1 units of the good have to be produced by a firm of country i to deliver one
unit to country j. Without loss of generality, I assume that τii = 1 and thus denote τij = τ
for all i 6= j.4 Thus, to produce output∑j qij (ϕ) , a firm requires∑j lij (ϕ) labor units:
∑
j
lij (ϕ) =
∑
j τijqij(ϕ)
ϕ · (1+ zi(ϕ))
1
σ−1
+
∑
j
fij + c (zi(ϕ)) .
Figure 1.2 represents the timing of the firm’s problem in the open economy.5 In a first
stage, as in Melitz (2003), entering the market means paying a labor sunk cost fE in order
4 Note that τij = τji by symmetry and there is no possibility of transportation arbitrage
5 As in Melitz (2003), the dynamics are trivial, since firms make all decisions at birth.
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to get a draw of the productivity parameter ϕ. In the second stage, with the knowledge of
their own productivity, firms decide which activities to undertake. Since both exporting
and innovation require paying a labor fixed cost, fX and fI, there will be four types of
firms in the open economy: Type D firms are only active in the domestic market and do
not perform innovation; Type DI firms are those active only in the domestic market that
innovate; Type X firms are those active in both the domestic and the foreign market that
do not perform any innovation; and Type XI firms are active in the domestic and foreign
markets and engage in innovation activities. Finally, in the third stage, firms choose prices.
I solve the firms problem through backward induction.
Enter Market
−fD
Exit Market
−fE
−fX − fI
Innovate
& Export
Do Not Innovate
& Do Not Export
−fI
Innovate &
Do Not Export
−fX
Do Not Innovate
& Export
1
Figure 1.2: Timing in the Open Economy
optimal pricing rule . In the last stage of the problem the firm sets its optimal
price, given its innovation decision and the market conditions which are summarized by
the price index Pj and Rj.
max
pij(ϕ)
pij (ϕ)qij (ϕ) − fij −
τijqij (ϕ)
ϕ
[
(1+ zi(ϕ))
1
σ−1
] − c (zi(ϕ))
The corresponding first order condition is
pij (ϕ) =
(
σ
σ− 1
)
τij
ϕ
· 1
(1+ zi(ϕ))
1
σ−1
∀ zi(ϕ). (1.8)
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optimal innovation decision. The returns of process innovation increase with
the participation in more countries. Thus, the optimal innovation rule for firm i
is obtained from the first order condition of the maximization of
∑
j piij (ϕ) =∑
j
[
pij(ϕ)qij(ϕ) − lij(ϕ)
]
with respect to zi(ϕ), provided that the firm makes higher
profits by innovating than by choosing not to innovate. This gives
zi(ϕ) =

[(
1+
∑
j6=i τ
1−σ
ij
) (
1
α+1
) pii(ϕ)qii(ϕ)
σ
] 1
α
if
∑
j pi
I
ij(ϕ) >
∑
j pi
NI
ij (ϕ),
0 if
∑
j pi
I
ij(ϕ) <
∑
j pi
NI
ij (ϕ).
(1.9)
Notice that the intensity of process innovation increases with the participation in
foreign markets as can be seen by comparing Equation Equation 1.3 and Equation 1.9.
To make the joint decision of whether to enter the foreign markets and whether to
innovate or not, firms will choose the option that yields the highest profits. Since countries
are symmetric I can drop the subscripts and classify firms in four types.
− Profits of a domestic non-innovator firm (Type D):
piD =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 − fD.
− Profits of a domestic innovator firm (Type DI):
piDI =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 (1+ zD (ϕ)) − fD − c (zD (ϕ)) .
− Profits of an exporter non-innovator firm (Type X):
piX =
(
1+nτ1−σ
) R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 −nfX − fD.
− Profits of an exporter innovator firm (Type XI):
piXI =
(
1+nτ1−σ
) R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 (1+ zX (ϕ)) −nfX − fD − c (zX (ϕ)) .
where fD = fii, fX = fij = fji for all j 6= i, zD(ϕ) =
[
1
α+1
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
] 1
α
, and
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zX(ϕ) =
[
1+nτ1−σ
] 1
α
[
1
α+1
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
] 1
α
.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
There will be three different equilibria that will cover the whole parameter space. First,
the low-cost innovation equilibrium, where the activity of exporting is relatively costly
in comparison to innovation, and therefore only the most productive firms will carry
out both activities, middle productivity firms will innovate but not export, and the
lower productivity firms will neither innovate nor export. Second, the low-cost trade
equilibrium, where the activity of innovation is relatively costly in comparison to exporting,
and therefore only the most productive firms will carry out both activities, middle
productivity firms will export but not engage in innovation and the lower productivity
firms will neither innovate nor export. Thirdly, between these two equilibria there will
be the intermediate equilibrium where firms are either very productive and can undertake
both activities or do not perform any of them.
The existence of these three equilibria is consistent with the empirical evidence
found both in the trade and the innovation literature. Costantini and Melitz (2008)
suggest that exporting and innovation are performed by the most productive firms
while domestic producers are typically less innovative and less productive, a feature
common to all the equilibria. Vives (2008) provides intuition for the decisions taken
by middle productivity firms in each equilibrium. If trade costs are relatively high,
middle productivity firms are domestic innovators because being an exporter without
innovating is not profitable. A decrease in trade costs attracts the most productive firms
from the foreign country, discouraging middle productivity domestic firms to undertake
innovation. The disappearance of domestic innovators as trade costs fall can be explained
by this Schumpeterian effect and is also predicted by the dynamic model of Costantini
and Melitz (2008). However, a fall in trade costs enables more firms to participate actively
in both markets which explains the existence of exporter non-innovators when trade costs
are low enough.
Different theoretical papers have identified these equilibria separately, but never all
in a single model. Bustos (2011) identifies the equilibrium where there are no domestic
innovators firms since it is an unprofitable choice. In Vannoorenberghe (2008) all firms
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innovate, therefore it is not possible to study the interaction between both decisions.
Finally, Navas-Ruiz and Sala (2007) identify the two extreme equilibria, but fail to identify
the intermediate equilibrium. The main contribution of the theoretical model is the
identification of all the equilibria with the ability to study the transitions between them
and the possible productivity gains that might occur through the intensive and extensive
margins of innovation. In the numerical section I will analyze whether these different
equilibria are relevant when calibrating the model to different European countries. In
what follows I describe each of the equilibria, the parameter restrictions that give rise
to the different equilibria, and conclude by focusing on the effect that trade has on
innovation.
1.3.2.1 Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
The low cost innovation equilibrium is characterized by exporting being less attractive than
innovation.
Profits
Profits Type D
Profits Type DI
Profits Type X
Profits Type XI
Series5
Series6
Series7
Series8
‐fD
ϕ
‐fD‐fI
‐fD‐fX
‐fD‐fX‐fI
ϕD ϕDI ϕXIExit Type D Type DI Type XI
Figure 1.3: Low Cost Innovation Selection Path
24
1.3 open economy
In Figure 1.3, I depict the profits of all types of firms as a function of productivity when
trade costs are relatively high in comparison to innovation costs. The envelope line shows
the type of firm that will be chosen by a firm with productivity ϕ as it maximizes profits.
In this equilibrium, the least productive firms (ϕ < ϕD) exit, the low productivity firms
(ϕD < ϕ < ϕDI) are active in the domestic market but do not innovate or export, middle
productivity firms (ϕDI < ϕ < ϕXI) are active only on the domestic market but innovate,
and the most productive firms (ϕ > ϕXI) are active both in the domestic and export
market, and innovate. Note that there is no range of productivity level where exporting
without innovating is profitable, that is, the marginal exporter is an innovator as well.
The conditions of entry in the domestic and export markets plus the innovation
condition allow to solve for the different productivity cutoffs in the low cost innovation
equilibrium.
The Zero Profit Condition (ZPC) in the domestic market is piD
(
ϕ∗D
)
= 0, so that:
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 =
fD(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) . (1.10)
The Innovation Profit Condition (IPC) determines the productivity cutoff ϕ∗DI which is
the productivity of the firm indifferent between innovating or not while operating only
on the domestic market, i.e. piDI
(
ϕ∗DI
)
= piD
(
ϕ∗DI
)
, so that:
(ϕ∗DI)
σ−1 =
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) . (1.11)
The Innovation Export Profit Condition (IXPC) determines the exporting innovation
cutoff ϕ∗XI which is the productivity of an innovating firm indifferent between
participating also on the exporting market or not:
piXI (ϕXI) − piDI (ϕXI) = 0. (1.12)
The following proposition shows for which part of the parameter space the low cost
innovation equilibrium exists.
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Proposition 2. The economy is in the low cost innovation equilibrium, ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
DI > ϕ
∗
D, if the
following parameter restrictions hold
1. τσ−1fX >
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ
fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
2.
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) > fD
Proof. The formal proof can be found in the Appendix A.2.1. The proof is divided in two
parts. First I show that there exist a single solution to Equation 1.12. The non linearity
present in the optimal innovation decision is the source of the complexity of finding a
closed form for the cutoff ϕ∗XI. Nevertheless, I show that selection into exporting and
innovation (ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
DI) requires that condition 1 of Proposition 2 holds, that is exporting
costs should be high enough relative to innovation costs. Notice that condition 2 of
Proposition 2 ensures that there is selection into innovation (ϕ∗DI > ϕ
∗
D). Secondly, I show
that equations Equation 1.10 to Equation 1.12 along with the Free Entry (FE) condition,
which requires that the sunk entry cost equals the present value of expected profits:
1
δ
[∫ϕ∗DI
ϕ∗D
piD (ϕ)dG (ϕ) +
∫ϕ∗XI
ϕ∗DI
piDI (ϕ)dG (ϕ) +
∫∞
ϕ∗XI
piXI (ϕ)dG (ϕ)
]
= fE (1.13)
uniquely determine the equilibrium price (P) , the number of firms (M) , and the
distribution of active firms productivity in the economy along with the productivity
cutoffs ϕ∗D, ϕ
∗
DI and ϕ
∗
XI.
1.3.2.2 Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
The low cost trade equilibrium is characterized by exporting being more attractive than
innovation. In Figure 1.4 , I depict the profits of all types of firms as a function of
productivity when trade costs are relatively low in comparison to innovation costs. The
envelope line shows the type of firm that will be chosen by a firm with productivity ϕ
as it maximizes profits. In this equilibrium, the least productive firms (ϕ < ϕD) exit, the
low productivity firms (ϕD < ϕ < ϕDI) are active in the domestic market but do not
innovate or export, middle productivity firms (ϕDI < ϕ < ϕXI) are active only on the
domestic market but innovate, and the most productive firms (ϕ > ϕXI) are active both in
the domestic and export market, and innovate. Note that there is no range of productivity
26
1.3 open economy
level where innovation without exporting is profitable, that is, the marginal innovator is
an exporter.
Profits Type D
Profits Type DI
Profits Type X
Profits
   
Profits Type XI
Series5
Series6
Series7
Series8
Series9
ϕ‐fD
‐fD‐fI
‐fD‐fX
ϕD ϕXExit Type D Type X Type XIϕXI
‐fD‐fX‐fI
Figure 1.4: Low Cost Trade Selection Path
The conditions of entry in the domestic and export markets, plus the innovation
conditions, allow to solve the different productivity cutoffs in the low cost trade equilibrium.
The Zero Profit Condition (ZPC) in the domestic market6 is piD
(
ϕ∗D
)
= 0 so that:
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 =
fD(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) . (1.14)
The Exporting Profit Condition (XPC) determines the exporting-entry productivity cutoff
ϕ∗X which is the productivity of the firm indifferent between staying in the domestic
market and participating in the export market i.e. piX
(
ϕ∗X
)
= piD
(
ϕ∗X
)
:
(ϕ∗X)
σ−1 =
fX(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
τ1−σ
. (1.15)
6 The ZPC condition is defined theoretically in the same way in every equilibrium. However, since the
aggregates in each situation are different, the entry cutoff will also be different.
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The Exporting Innovation Profit Condition (XIPC) determines the innovation exporting
productivity cutoff ϕ∗XI, which is the productivity of an exporting firm indifferent
between innovating or not, i.e. piXI
(
ϕ∗XI
)
= piX
(
ϕ∗XI
)
:
(ϕ∗XI)
σ−1 =
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
(1+nτ1−σ)
. (1.16)
The following proposition shows for which part of the parameter space the low cost
trade equilibrium exists.
Proposition 3. The economy is in the low cost trade equilibrium, ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
X > ϕ
∗
D, if the
following parameter restrictions hold
(
fI
α
) αα+1
(α+ 1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
> τσ−1fX > fD
Proof. Selection into exporting and innovation (ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
X) requires innovation costs to be
high enough relative to trade costs and selection into exporting (ϕ∗X > ϕ
∗
D) requires trade
costs to be high enough relative to production costs. Equation 1.14 to Equation 1.16
along with the Free Entry (FE) condition, which requires that the sunk entry cost equals
the present value of expected profits:
1
δ
[∫ϕ∗X
ϕ∗D
piD (ϕ)dG (ϕ) +
∫ϕ∗XI
ϕ∗X
piX (ϕ)dG (ϕ) +
∫∞
ϕ∗XI
piXI (ϕ)dG (ϕ)
]
= fE (1.17)
uniquely determine the equilibrium price (P) , the number of firms (M) , and the
distribution of active firms productivity in the economy along with the productivity
cutoffs ϕ∗XI, ϕ
∗
X, and ϕ
∗
D. See Appendix A.2.2 for a formal proof.
1.3.2.3 Intermediate Equilibrium
The intermediate equilibrium is characterized by exporting and innovation being relatively
equally attractive. In Figure 1.5, I depict the profits of all types of firms as a function
of productivity when trade costs are neither very high nor very low in comparison to
innovation costs. The envelope line shows the type of firm that will be chosen by a firm
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with productivity ϕ as it maximizes profits. In this equilibrium, the least productive firms
(ϕ < ϕD) exit, the low productivity firms (ϕD < ϕ < ϕXI) are active in the domestic
market but do not innovate or export, and the most productive firms (ϕ > ϕXI) are active
both in the domestic and export market, and innovate. Note that there is no range of
productivity level where exporting without innovating or innovating without exporting
is profitable, that is, the marginal exporter is an innovator as well.
Profits Type D
Profits Type DI
P fit T X
Profits
ro s  ype 
Profits Type XI
Type D
#REF!
‐fD
ϕ
‐fD‐fI
f f‐ D‐ X
‐fD‐fX‐fI
ϕD ϕXIExit Type D Type XI
Figure 1.5: Intermediate Selection Path
The conditions of entry in the domestic markets, plus the innovation and export
condition, allow to solve the different productivity cutoffs in the intermediate equilibrium.
The Zero Profit Condition (ZPC) in the domestic market7 is piD
(
ϕ∗D
)
= 0 so that:
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 =
fD(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
) . (1.18)
7 The ZPC condition is defined theoretically in the same way in every equilibrium. However, since the
aggregates in each situation are different, the entry cutoff will also be different.
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The Exporting Innovation Profit Condition (XIPC) determines the innovation exporting
productivity cutoff ϕ∗XI, which is the productivity of a firm indifferent between exporting
and innovating or not.
piXI (ϕ
∗
XI) − piD (ϕ
∗
XI) = 0 (1.19)
The following proposition shows for which part of the parameter space the intermediate
equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4. The economy is in the intermediate equilibrium, ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
D, if the following
parameter restrictions hold
1.
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ
fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) > τσ−1fX
2. τσ−1fX >
(
fI
α
) αα+1
(α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
3.
(
fI
α
) αα+1
(α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
> fD
Proof. If the first parameter restriction does not hold, then for some firms is profitable
to innovate without exporting. If the second parameter restriction does not hold, then for
some firms is profitable to export without innovating. Therefore, the trade costs must be in
between the limits of innovation, so that firms either export and innovate or simply remain
in the domestic market. The non linearity present in the optimal innovation decision is the
source of the complexity of finding a closed form for the cutoff ϕ∗XI, nevertheless I show
that conditions 1 and 2 hold. Furthermore, I show that Equation 1.18 and Equation 1.19
along with the Free Entry (FE) condition, which requires that the sunk entry cost equals
the present value of expected profits:
1
δ
[∫ϕ∗XI
ϕ∗D
piD (ϕ)dG (ϕ) +
∫∞
ϕ∗XI
piXI (ϕ)dG (ϕ)
]
= fE (1.20)
uniquely determine the equilibrium price (P) , the number of firms (M) , and the
distribution of active firms productivity in the economy along with the productivity
cutoffs ϕ∗XI, and ϕ
∗
D. See Appendix A.2.3 for a formal proof.
30
1.3 open economy
1.3.3 Trade, Innovation and Aggregate Productivity
Trade has indirect effects on the average productivity through innovation. Moving from
the low cost innovation equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium, the cost of exporting
relative to the cost of innovation decreases, therefore the effect trade has on innovation
will be differentiated according to the level of transportation costs.
low cost innovation equilibrium .
Combine Equation 1.10 and Equation 1.11, the relation between the cutoffs can be
written explicitly as:
(ϕ∗DI)
σ−1 =
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
fD
(ϕ∗D)
σ−1 = Λ (ϕ∗D)
σ−1 . (1.21)
The relationship between the productivity cutoffs of domestic innovators and domestic
non innovators is the same as in Autarky (see Equation 1.6), however in the open
economy there are indirect effects via the input factor market that will impact the entry
cutoff and therefore in the domestic innovation cutoff. In the the low cost innovation
equilibrium survival becomes tougher, the presence of foreign firms pushes up real wages
and it is harder for lower productivity firms to earn positive profits, hence the least
productive firms exit the economy
(
ϕLCID > ϕ
AUT
D
)
and firms need to be more productive
in order to undertake innovation
(
ϕLCIDI > ϕ
AUT
DI
)
.
Therefore, in the low cost innovation equilibrium the number of firms that perform
innovation in the economy is reduced with respect to the Autarky case. Nevertheless,
we cannot say anything on the amount of process innovation, since it could be possible
that the increase in innovation by the firms who export make up for the loss of the firms
who do not innovate anymore and the domestic firms who innovate less intensively than
before. In other words, gains along the intensive margin of innovation might offset the
loss along the extensive margin of innovation.
low cost trade equilibrium .
Combine Equation 1.14 to Equation 1.16, the relation between the cutoffs can be
written explicitly as:
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(ϕXI)
σ−1 =
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
(1+ τ1−σ)
(ϕD)
σ−1
fD
= Λt (ϕD)
σ−1 (1.22)
(ϕXI)
σ−1 =
[(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
]
τ1−σ
(1+ τ1−σ)
(ϕX)
σ−1
fX
= ΛtX (ϕX)
σ−1 (1.23)
(ϕX)
σ−1 =
fXτ
σ−1
fD
(ϕD)
σ−1 =
Λt
ΛtX
(ϕD)
σ−1 (1.24)
where ΛtX =
fXτ
σ−1
fD
Λt , Λt = Λ
(1+τ1−σ)
and Λ is the relationship between the innovation
and the entry cutoff in Autarky (Equation 1.6) and in the low cost innovation equilibrium
(Equation 1.21) .
In the open economy there are indirect effects via the general equilibrium that
will impact the entry cutoff and therefore the innovation cutoff. Survival becomes
tougher, the presence of foreign firms pushes up real wages and it is harder for lower
productivity firms to earn positive profits. Hence the least productive firms exit the
economy
(
ϕLCTD > ϕ
AUT
D
)
and firms need to be more productive in order to undertake
innovation ( ϕLCTXI is pushed upwards via general equilibrium). However, there is
an effect via artial equilibrium on the innovation cutoff int he opposite direction. It
follows that Λ > Λt, which means that the cost-to benefit ratio is smaller in the
low cost trade equilibrium than in Autarky or in the low cost innovation equilibrium. This
difference is numerically given by 1
(1+τ1−σ)
whose denominator indicates the further
revenue differential associated to innovation on the foreign market available through
trade. Economically, since exporters expand their scales of operation, the variable cost and
benefits of the productivity enhancing innovation performed are spread on more units
while the up-front cost of innovation is unchanged, creating the difference we are talking
about. The comparison of Equation 1.6 and Equation 1.22 shows that trade decreases
(ceteris paribus) the innovation productivity cutoff boosting within-plant innovation (ϕLCTXI
is pushed downwards via partial equilibrium).
In the low cost trade equilibrium, trade has a positive impact in the intensive margin
of innovation. Moreover, if the partial equilibrium effect offsets the general equilibrium
effect, then trade also has a positive impact in the extensive margin of innovation.
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Proposition 5. In the low cost trade equilibrium, if productivity draws are distributed according
to a Pareto distribution, then the proportion of firms doing innovation activities rises with respect
to Autarky
(
ϕAUTDI > ϕ
LCT
XI
)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.3 for the formal proof.
1.4 discussion
The firm productivity distribution varies along the parameter space according to the
relation between trade costs and the relative innovation costs. This is especially relevant
for firms with an intermediate level of productivity, as their decisions will be most
sensitive to these costs. In particular, in the low cost innovation equilibrium, when trade
costs are high enough, they are domestic innovators. In the low cost trade equilibrium,
when trade costs are low enough in relation to innovation costs, middle productivity
firms will be exporters, and the most productive of them will export, and innovate. In
between these two equilibria, there is the intermediate equilibrium, where trade costs are
not relatively high enough for firms to be domestic innovators nor low enough for firms
to be exporters non-innovators. That is, middle productivity firms are either exporter
innovators or domestic firms. These choices are the ones that determine the parameter
restrictions associated to each equilibrium. Furthermore, notice that the three equilibria
cover the whole parameter space, and therefore the firm productivity distribution and
the effects of opening up to trade of an economy can be always determined. Table 1.1
summarizes all the possible equilibria in the open economy and the parameter restrictions
associated to each one.
The model has implications for the aggregate productivity level. Firstly, trade induces
the exit of the less productive firms and the reallocation of market shares towards the
more productive firms, raising the industry average productivity in the long run. This is
the selection effect described in Melitz (2003). And secondly, trade has indirect effects
on the average productivity through innovation. Moving from the low cost innovation
equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium, the cost of exporting relative to the cost of
innovation decreases, therefore the effect trade has on innovation will be differentiated
according to the level of transportation costs. On the one hand, there is an effect
through the intensive margin of innovation. The innovation intensity increases with the
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participation in foreign markets, and thus the effect will be larger in the low cost trade
equilibrium where the economy is more open, followed by the intermediate equilibrium. In
the low cost innovation equilibrium such effect is undetermined, since there is a positive
effect from the exporters being more innovative but a negative effect from the domestic
firms that innovate being less innovative. On the other hand, there is an effect through
the extensive margin of innovation. In the section before was shown that the impact
on average productivity through the extensive margin will be negative in the low cost
innovation equilibrium, undetermined in the intermediate equilibrium, and can be positive in
the low cost trade equilibrium.
Equilibrium Conditions
Low Cost Innovation
Equilibrium
τσ−1fX >
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ
fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
&(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) > fD
Intermediate
Equilibrium
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ
fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) > τσ−1fX
&
τσ−1fX >
(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
> fD
Low Cost Trade
Equilibrium
(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
> τσ−1fX > fD
Table 1.1: Equilibria in the Open Economy
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1.5 conclusions
This paper has proposed a trade model with heterogeneous firms that decide not
just whether or how much to export but also whether or how much to innovate.
By incorporating the extensive and intensive margins of trade and innovation, three
equilibria may arise. In all equilibria high-productivity firms export and innovate,
whereas low-productivity neither export nor innovate. What differs across equilibria is
the behavior of medium-productivity firms. In an economy with trade costs that are
low relative to innovation costs, medium-productivity firms export without innovating,
whereas in an economy with trade costs that are high relative to innovation costs,
medium-productivity firms innovate without exporting. In a third equilibrium, in
between the other two, some medium-productivity firms export and innovate, whereas
others do neither.
Trade has indirect effects on the aggregate productivity through innovation. Moving
from the low cost innovation equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium, the cost of exporting
relative to the cost of innovation decreases, therefore the effect a trade policy has on
innovation will be differentiated according to the level of transportation costs. On the
one hand, there is an effect through the intensive margin of innovation. As long as the
marginal innovator is an exporter (low cost trade equilibrium and intermediate equilibrium),
the effect of a trade policy will always be positive. If the marginal innovator innovator is
not an exporter (low cost innovation equilibrium), while a trade policy will induce exporters
to be more innovative, the non-exporters will be less innovative. On the other hand, there
is an effect through the extensive margin of innovation. The impact of a trade policy on
aggregate productivity through the extensive margin of innovation will be negative in
the low cost innovation equilibrium, undetermined in the intermediate equilibrium and can be
positive in the low cost trade equilibrium.
These findings stress the importance of having a model that jointly analyzes the
extensive and intensive margins of both trade and innovation. Not doing so would not
just result in a less rich theoretical structure, it would also keep us from correctly assessing
the impact of different policies aimed at fomenting trade and innovation.
Of course, this model has abstracted from a number of potentially relevant features
that go beyond the scope of this paper. First, I have exclusively focused on a steady state
environment, thus ignoring the transition dynamics. As shown by Alessandria and Choi
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(2011) and Burstein and Melitz (2011), not taking into account transition dynamics may
significantly impact the welfare effects of trade liberalization. Second, the model does not
consider uncertainty in innovation. While most of the literature on trade and innovation
assumes there is no risk involved,8 the empirical evidence suggests otherwise: there is
risk that an innovator will not identify important needs, that innovation teams disrupt
the regular operations of a business, or that even a promising idea is not accepted by
the customers whose need it was meant to address. Third, I have assumed that there is
no strategic interaction between firms and therefore the innovation activities of one firm
do not have any influence in the innovation activities of the other firms. The existence of
externalities in process innovation could have a significant effect on the results. Fourth,
the model could be used to analyze the effect of joint trade and innovation policies. The
right mix of policies could lead to greater gains in aggregate productivity.
8 An exception is Atkeson and Burstein (2010) who introduce uncertainty in the outcome of the investment in
process innovation, although firms always get some returns (no innovation fails).
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T R A D E , I N N O VAT I O N A N D P R O D U C T I V I T Y: A Q U A N T I TAT I V E
A N A LY S I S O F E U R O P E
Abstract. This paper evaluates quantitatively the model of trade and innovation proposed
in Chapter 1. After calibrating the model to five European countries, I show that the
different equilibria are plausible, and provide quantitative evidence that supports the
predictions of my theory. The impact of trade on aggregate productivity and welfare
depends crucially on the equilibrium the economy is in. When lowering the variable costs
of trade, the welfare effects arising from reallocating market shares across firms may be
non-negligible, and when lowering the fixed cost of trade, aggregate productivity need
not always increase.
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2.1 introduction
Chapter 1 provides a framework in which to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on
productivity and welfare in a model that incorporates both the extensive and the intensive
margins of both trade and innovation.
The aim of the paper is to show that introducing these different margins is key
for understanding the impact of trade liberalization. Different equilibria may arise,
depending on the relative costs of trade and innovation. I show that they are quantitatively
plausible by calibrating the model to five European countries. I then show that the impact
of trade liberalization depends crucially on the equilibrium the economy is in and the
nature of the liberalization. For example, in the case of a drop in variable trade costs, this
paper shows that the effects on welfare from changes in firms’ decisions to export and
innovate may be non-negligible, in contrast to the literature.1 As another example, a drop
in the fixed cost of trade need not always have a positive effect on aggregate productivity.
Indeed, in an economy in which many firms export, but few firms innovate, lowering the
fixed cost of trade, by increasing the number of exporters, may make innovating more
expensive, thus lowering aggregate productivity.
To assess the plausibility of the theory in Chapter 1, I calibrate the model to five
European countries. In particular, the model is calibrated to match a number of salient
features of innovation, firm size distribution, and international trade in France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom, using the firm-level data set European Firms in a
Global Economy (EFIGE). The survey, conducted during the year 2009, is representative
of the manufacturing sector in each country. Especially relevant for my analysis is the
information on employment, internationalization, and innovation. A first result is that
the different equilibria are not only theoretically relevant, but also empirically plausible:
different countries are in different equilibria. This is important, since the theory predicts
that the effect of trade liberalization on aggregate productivity and welfare depends
crucially on the equilibrium a country is in.
A first quantitative exercise consists of quantifying the effect of a reduction in variable
trade costs on aggregate productivity. The analysis is based on the ideal measure of
aggregate productivity defined by Atkeson and Burstein (2010). I focus on this measure,
because it captures the productivity that is relevant for welfare. Apart from the direct cost
1 See Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Atkeson and Burstein (2010) on this topic.
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savings effects of a drop in variable trade costs, the theory predicts that there are a number
of indirect effects. First, it induces the exit of less productive firms and the reallocation of
market shares towards the more productive firms. This is the selection effect described in
Melitz (2003). Second, the innovation intensity increases with the participation in foreign
markets, so the effect through the intensive margin of innovation should be positive.2
Third, the theory predicts that the effect through the extensive margin of innovation can
be positive or negative. In the low cost trade equilibrium and the intermediate equilibrium,
all innovators are exporting. In this case a decrease in variable trade costs increases the
incentives to be an exporter (and to be an exporter innovator), so that the effect through
the extensive margin of innovation is positive. In contrast, in the low cost innovation
equilibrium, some of the innovators do not export. In this case, a drop in trade costs makes
it harder for domestic firms to innovate, so that the effect through the extensive margin
of innovation is negative.
My findings corroborate the theoretical predictions. In particular, in most countries
the effect of a drop in variable trade costs on aggregate productivity through the
extensive margin is positive, except in those that are in the low cost innovation equilibrium,
where the effect is negative. My findings also shed new light on which channels matter
when analyzing the impact of trade liberalization on aggregate productivity Atkeson
and Burstein (2010) have suggested that the indirect effects of trade liberalization on
productivity are negligible. That is, liberalizing trade improves productivity through the
standard direct effect of saving resources on trade, whereas indirect effects coming from
changes in firms’ decisions related to exit, trade, and innovation are essentially zero. In
contrast, my findings show that this depends crucially on the equilibrium an economy
is in. While in most countries the indirect effects are indeed negligible, this is not the
case of countries in the low cost innovation equilibrium. This underscores the importance of
having a model that encompasses both the extensive and intensive margins of trade and
innovation.
A second quantitative exercise focuses on the effectiveness of lower the fixed costs
of trade or innovation to increase productivity . While my first exercise focused on a
reduction in variable trade costs, I now show that a reduction in fixed trade or innovation
2 Despite the intensity of innovation from domestic firms decreasing (if there are in the economy), the increase
on the intensity of innovation of exporter firms ensures that the final effect through the intensive margin is
positive.
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costs may also have very different effects depending on the equilibrium the economy is
in. While in general the effect of lowering the fixed cost of trade is positive, I find that in
the low cost trade equilibrium it is negative. The intuition is as follows. In such equilibrium,
there are many exporters, but only the most productive innovate. Since all innovators are
also exporters, by increasing the incentives to enter the export market, a drop in the fixed
costs of trade pushes up real wages, reducing the incentives to innovate. As a result, both
the number of innovators and the intensity of the remaining innovators decline, which
translates in the final effect on welfare being negative.
The simulations reveal that a discrete drop in fixed trade costs, can induce productivity
gains from 1% to 20% in total, and only if the economy is already very open (in the low cost
trade equilibrium) might a further drop in fixed trade costs be damaging to the economy,
which suggest that a fixed trade cost liberalization does not have the same nature than
a variable trade cost liberalization. In contrast to a fixed trade cost reduction, a fixed
innovation cost drop has little effect on productivity, the maximum increase being around
2%, and has far more damaging effects if it induces economies to be less export-oriented,
since then the productivity might decrease by up to 7%.
A key contribution of my work is that it explores quantitatively the responses of
firms along both the extensive and intensive margins of innovation to changes in the
environment. My results echoe those of Atkeson and Burstein (2010) in that welfare gains
from trade do not depend on how a change in variable trade costs affects firms’ exit,
export, and innovation decisions, if the extensive margin of innovation is not affected by
the policy. At the same time, my result complements theirs by explaining carefully how
a negative incentive to innovate, driven by a drop in variable trade costs, actually implies
that firms’ exit, export, and innovation decisions can have an impact on welfare gains.
My work here is also related to a large literature on the aggregate implications of
trade liberalization. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) study a variant of Melitz’s model
that features endogenous growth through spillovers. They show that depending on the
nature of the spillovers, a reduction in international trade costs can increase or decrease
growth through changes in product innovation. My model centers on process innovation
and abstracts from such spillovers. Arkolakis et al. (2012) calculate the welfare gains from
trade in a wide class of trade models, including Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) models
with Pareto productivities. The main differences between this paper and mine is that they
abstract from innovation and focus only on changes in marginal trade costs.
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The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the dataset. In Section 2.3,
I calibrate the model to match five main European economies. In Section 2.4, I analyze
the effects in aggregate productivity and welfare of a drop in variable trade costs, a drop
in fixed trade cost and a drop in fixed innovation costs. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 data
The data I analyze comes from the European Project EFIGE, where EFIGE stands for
“European Firms in a Global Economy”. The objective of this project is to examine the
pattern of internationalization of European firms.
The data was collected in 2010 covers the years 2007 to 2009. The data consist of a
representative sample at the country level for the manufacturing industry of firms owning
establishments with more than ten employees in seven European economies: Austry,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom. The distribution by firm
size for the sample and the reference population are shown for each country in Table 2.1.3
Between Between More
Total10 and 49 50 and 249 than 250
Country S P S P S P S P
Austria 339 5, 568 107 1, 524 46 459 492 7, 551
France 2, 151 32, 019 608 7, 365 214 1, 986 2, 973 41, 370
Germany 1, 836 52, 489 793 16, 988 306 3, 970 2, 935 79, 144
Hungary 325 6, 505 118 1, 874 45 460 488 8, 839
Italy 2, 447 77, 092 429 10, 062 145 1, 408 3, 021 88, 562
Spain 2, 280 38, 116 406 6, 241 146 1, 010 2, 832 45, 367
U.K. 1, 515 27, 187 529 7, 794 112 1, 758 2, 156 36, 739
Table 2.1: Distribution by size, sample (S)/reference population(P)
3 The sample design over-represents large firms, therefore sampling weights have been constructed in terms
of size-sector cells to make the sample representative of the underlying population.
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The database, for the first time in Europe, combines measures of firms’ international
activities (e.g. exports, outsourcing, FDI, import) as well as quantitative and qualitative
information on around 150 items ranging from R&D and innovation, labor organization,
financing and organizational activities.4
The survey contains information on several dimensions of innovation and exporting.
On the one hand, regarding export activities there are both qualitative and quantitative
questions. Particularly I center in firms that are regular exporters, and how much did
those export activities represent in their 2008 turnover. On the other hand, regarding
innovation activities there is quite an extensive classification on the kind of innovation
performed as well as several quantitative measures for it. Particularly, firms are asked
if they did carry out during the years 2007 to 2009 process innovation, where process
innovation is defined as the adoption of a production technology which is either new
or significantly improved (the innovation should be new to the firm but the firm must
not necessarily have to be the first to introduce this process). And finally, as a quantitative
measure of innovation we use the number of employees involved in R&D activities, where
R&D consist of creative activities aimed at increasing the knowledge and using this
knowledge in new applications, such as in the development of technologically new or
improved products and processes. I use this information to calibrate the model described
in Chapter 1 and analyze quantitatively the relevance of the theoretical predictions.
2.3 calibration
In this section I calibrate the model to match a number of salient features of innovation,
the firm size distribution, and international trade in five European countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom), using firm-level data survey by the EFIGE
project.5
Parameters common to all countries are taken directly from the empirical literature,
while parameters specific to each country are calibrated such that particular firm-level
moments in the model match those moments in the data. Parameters common to all
4 Altomonte and Aquilante (2012) provides more information on the construction of the dataset and a
comprehensive set of validation measures that have been used to assess the comparability of the survey
data with official statistics.
5 The model is not calibrated to the other two countries in the sample, Austria and Hungary, due to missing
observations in the main variables used in the calibration.
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countries are the elasticity of substitution, the elasticity of innovation, the probability of
firm exit, and the sunk cost of entry. The elasticity of substitution is set to be consistent
with empirical estimates provided by Broda and Weinstein (2006). The medians reported
vary from 2.2 to 4.8 depending on the level of aggregation, thus I set σ = 3.2 which lies
within the estimated range of values. A clear limitation of the data is the lack of a panel
dimension. This affects the calibration of the probability of exit and the sunk cost entry,
since the dataset does not have information on the entry and exit of firms. But more
importantly, affects as well the calibration of the innovation parameter α, crucial in the
determination of the equilibrium of an economy, since the elasticity of innovation across
the European countries cannot be computed. Hence, these three parameters are taken as
well as common to all the countries. The innovation parameter α is taken to be 0.9. This
is consistent with the estimate of Rubini (2011), who sets the elasticity of productivity
to resources devoted to innovation to match a 5% gain in labor productivity in Canada
following the tariff reduction in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement between 1980 and
1996. The probability of exit and the sunk cost entry, which determine the entry and exit
of firms, are set to δ = 0.05 and fE = 1 following Bernard et al. (2007).
Parameters specific to each country are innovation fixed costs (fI), export fixed costs
(fX), variable trade costs (τ), domestic fixed costs (fD), the productivity distribution, and
the number of trading partners. The first four are calibrated jointly to match the number
of workers in innovation, the percentage of exporters innovators in the economy, the ratio
of exports to revenue, and the percentage of executives (including entrepreneurs and
middle management) in the labor force. To match the productivity distribution, I target
the slope of the firm size distribution in terms of employees, and similarly to Helpman
et al. (2004) and Chaney (2008), I assume the productivity is distributed according to a
Pareto with a probability density function
g(ϕ) =
θ
ϕθ+1
,
where ϕ ∈ [1,∞) and θ is the curvature parameter. In accordance to the model considered,
I estimate by maximum likelihood the curvature parameter associated to the distribution
of firms, θ˜ = θ/(σ− 1)
(
α+1
α
)
. Given that the model assumes symmetric country sizes, in
order to account for the differences in size of the domestic market6, instead of considering
6 For example, Italy has roughly 20 million persons more than Spain, hence the domestic demand is larger.
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that each country is trading with one single symmetric country the number of a country’s
trading partners n is determined by the country’s size relative to the size of the other
countries. For example, in a three country world, if country A has two employees and
country B and C have only one employee, the number of trading partners for country
A is one (n = 1), since it is as if they were trading with a partner of their size, and the
number of trading partners for country B and for country C is three (n = 3). The targets
are reported in Table 2.2.
Country Slope Employees Executives Export Exporters R&D
. Volume Innovators Workers
France 1.06 2, 903, 820 17.4% 27.30% 22.82% 6.81%
Germany 1.10 5, 565, 414 9.3% 19.48% 27.59% 6.16%
Italy 1.43 3, 555, 052 7.6% 32.81% 27.73% 5.81%
Spain 1.27 2, 010, 424 9.5% 21.50% 19.89% 4.85%
U.K. 1.01 3, 729, 340 14.5% 25.84% 24.31% 7.38%
Table 2.2: Calibration Targets
Several facts stand out in Table 2.2 that will help us interpret the differences in the
calibrated parameters. There are important differences in export shares across countries.
While exports make up 33% of revenues for Italian firms, that figure drops to 21.5% in
Spain, and 19.5% in Germany. Similarly, while 28% of Italian and German firms export
and innovate, that share drops to 20% in Spain. The differences in R&D workers are not
as substantial across countries: U.K. is the country that employs most workers in R&D
(7.4%) while Spain is the country that employs least (4.85%). As for the slope of the
distribution of exporting firms, a higher number indicates a steeper slope, and therefore
a smaller proportion of larger firms exporting. Consistent with this, in Italy and Spain the
typical exporter is relatively smaller, whereas in France and the U.K. there are many large
exporting firms. The percentage of executives and middle management also differs quite
a bit across countries. France and United Kingdom appear to have a more horizontal
structure given that the percentage of executives (included entrepreneurs and middle
management) is 17.4% and 14.5% respectively, whereas for Italian firms it drops to 7.6%,
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indicating a more vertical structure. The calibrated parameters for each country are in
Table 2.3.
Country θ n fD τ fX fI Ω = fXτσ−1 fEX = nfX
France 4.9 6 1.0 1.88 0.4 5.8 1.8 2.6
Germany 5.1 2 2.0 1.14 8.4 10.6 11.2 16.8
Italy 6.6 4 1.5 1.19 5.5 6.0 8.1 22.0
Spain 5.9 8 2.0 1.93 4.3 2.6 18.3 34.4
U.K. 4.7 4 1.3 1.68 0.6 8.5 1.9 2.4
Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameters
Several of these results require some further explanation. First, Germany’s fixed trade
costs are relatively high with respect to other countries such as Spain, in spite of being
a more open economy. This is easily explained by the fact that fX represents the fixed
trade cost paid by export destination. Because Germany’s domestic market is much larger
than Spain’s, my assumption on symmetric countries implies that Germany has 2 trading
partners, compared to 8 in the case of Spain. Therefore, as shown in Table 2.3, the effective
fixed trade costs of a German exporter is 16.8, while the effective fixed trade costs of a
Spanish exporter is 34.4 labor units. Second, France has a relatively high variable trade
cost, similar to Spain, but this is partly offset by the relatively low fixed export cost. Finally,
in spite of Spanish innovation fixed costs being the lowest, this does not imply higher
innovation. In Spain, exporting is a very expensive activity in comparison to innovation,
which explains why some domestic firms innovate without exporting. However, those
firms innovate less intensively than the exporter innovators, so that the overall intensity
of innovation in Spain is lower than in other countries.
The calibration predicts in which of the three equilibria described in the theory is each
of the countries considered. The prediction is in Table 2.4, each equilibrium is determined
by the openness of the economy and the level of innovation. The openness depends on
both the fixed and the variable trade cost. The parameter Ω in Table 2.3 captures their
joint effect, so that a country with a lower Ω is more open. In agreement with the theory,
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France, and United Kingdom, the most open countries with relatively high innovation, are
in the low cost trade equilibrium. Germany and Italy, which are less open and have average
innovation are in the intermediate equilibrium. Spain, the most closed and least innovative
country of the five, is in the low cost innovation equilibrium.
Country Predicted Equilibrium
France Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
Germany Intermediate Equilibrium
Italy Intermediate Equilibrium
Spain Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
U.K. Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
Table 2.4: Predicted Equilibrium
2.4 quantitative analysis
In the numerical analysis I consider the effect on aggregate productivity and welfare of
the following experiments: a decrease in variable trade costs, a decrease in fixed trade
costs, and a decrease in fixed innovation costs.
The theory described in Chapter 1 predicts that a decrease in variable trade cost
can have a substantial impact on individual firms’ decisions, and thus on aggregate
productivity. In addition to a direct effects on productivity, coming from trade being less
wasteful and independent from changes in firms’ decisions, it identifies three channels
through which indirect productivity gains can happen: the selection effect, the extensive
margin of innovation, and the intensive margin of innovation. The first quantitative
exercise focuses on the decomposition of the change in aggregate productivity into these
components and quantifying their relevance. The second quantitative exercise focuses on
the effect of lowering the fixed costs of trade and innovation on productivity. Much of
the literature has limited its attention to the decrease in variable trade costs. However, in
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a model with both trade and innovation, liberalizing trade by lowering fixed costs or by
reducing variable costs may have very different results.
The section is structured as follows. First, I define the aggregate productivity measure
used in the quantitative exercises, as well as its relation to welfare, following the definition
of Atkeson and Burstein (2010). Second, I decompose changes in aggregate productivity
following a drop in variable trade costs into its different components. Finally, I analyze
the effectiveness of a trade liberalization policy versus the effectiveness of an innovation
policy on aggregate productivity.
2.4.1 Aggregate Productivity
Assume the economy is in steady-state. To solve for aggregate quantities I define indices
of aggregate productivity across firms implied by firms decisions. The first of these, ΨD,
is an index of productivity aggregated across all operating, non-exporting domestic firms,
excluding their innovation activities:
ΨD =
∫ϕX
ϕD
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ).
The second, ΨX, is an index of productivity aggregated across all exporting domestic
firms, excluding their innovation activities:
ΨX =
∫∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ).
The third, ΨI, is an index of the productivity coming exclusively from the innovation
activities. Since in some equilibria there are only exporter innovators, while in others
there are exporter and domestic innovators, ΨI is defined slightly differently for each of
the equilibria:
ΨLCIEI =
∫ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ) +
[
1+ τ(1−σ)
]α+1
α
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ);
ΨIEI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ);
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ΨLCTEI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ);
where the superscripts LCIE, IE, and LCTE refer to, respectively, the low cost innovation
equilibrium, the intermediate equilibrium, and the low cost trade equilibrium.
The output per production worker measures aggregate productivity, Ψ, whereas the
output per worker measures welfare, W. Both measures can be expressed as a function of
the productivity indices previously described:
Ψ =
Q
Lp
=
[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1+ τ1−σ
)
ΨX + F(τ)IΨI
)] 1
σ−1 ; (2.1)
W =
Q
L
=
(
σ− 1
σ
)[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1+ τ1−σ
)
ΨX + F(τ)IΨI
)] 1
σ−1 ; (2.2)
where I is the minimum level of innovation of an innovating firm in each equilibrium,
and F(τ) is a function of the variable trade costs different in each equilibrium. Appendix
B.1 provides a formal derivation of the aggregate productivity in the different equilibria.
I focus on this measure of productivity because it is the measure of productivity that
is relevant for welfare in my model and is similar to the ideal measure of productivity
defined by Atkeson and Burstein (2010), hence making the results comparable.7
2.4.2 Decomposing the Productivity Effect of a Reduction in Variable Trade Costs
In this section, I analytically and quantitatively study the impact of a change in
marginal trade costs on the measure of aggregate productivity. Following Atkeson and
Burstein (2010), I do a first order approximation of the effect of a reduction in marginal
international trade costs τ, decomposing its impact on productivity into a direct effect
and an indirect effect. The direct effect takes all firms’ decisions as given, and simply
measures the productivity gains from trade being less wasteful because of the change
7 This measure of aggregate productivity does not necessarily correspond to aggregate productivity as
measured in the data. If all differentiated products are intermediate goods used in production of final goods,
changes in the price level for final expenditures can be directly measure using final goods, and ∆logΨ is the
variation of measured productivity. If all different products are consumed directly as final goods, then the
problem of measuring changes in the price level for final expenditures is more complicated. See Atkeson and
Burstein (2010) and Bajona et al. (2008) for a discussion of related issues.
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in trade costs. Notice that the magnitude of this direct effect is determined simply by
the share of exports in production and is independent of changes decisions, whereas the
indirect effect arises from changes in firms’ entry, export, and innovation decisions, which
are themselves responding to the change in trade costs. The following proposition shows
the decomposition.
Proposition 6. The total change in productivity from a change in trade costs and be decomposed
into a direct effect and an indirect effect. Moreover, the indirect effect can be decomposed into an
entry effect, a reallocation effect, and an innovation effect.
∆logΨ = −sX∆log(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
−
(
∆F(τ)
τ
)
sInnI∆log(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporters ′ Innovation

Direct
Effect
+ 1σ−1
 ∆log(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Effect
+ sD∆log (ΨD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Market
+
(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sX∆log (ΨX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Market
+ sInnI∆log(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
+ sInnI∆log(ΨI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Innovation

Indirect
Effect
Proof. Since in each equilibria the decisions on innovation are different, I use a general
syntax to point out the different components of the decomposition. The exact equations
along with the full proof are in Appendix B.2. In what follows, I sketch briefly the algebra
behind the decomposition. 8
Recall that for every x ∈ R
∆x
x
= ∆log(x).
8 This derivation works well only for infinitesimal changes
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Take logs of Ψ
Ψ =
1
σ− 1
[
log(M) + log
(
ΨD +
(
1+ τ1−σ
)
ΨX + F(τ)IΨI
)]
.
And derivatives
∆logΨ =
1
σ− 1
[
∆log(M) +∆logΨˆ
]
.
∆logΨˆ =
1
Ψˆ
[
∆ΨD +∆
(
1+ τ1−σ
)
ΨX +
(
1+ τ1−σ
)
∆ΨX
+∆F(τ)IΨI + F(τ)∆IΨI + F(τ)I∆ΨI] .
Define the share of domestic production excluding innovation in the value of production
sD =
ΨD
Ψˆ
, the share of export production excluding innovation in the value of production
sX =
nτ1−σΨX
Ψˆ
, and the share of exporters innovation activities in the value of production
sLCIXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α ΨXI
Ψˆ
and sIE,LCTXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)ΨXI
Ψˆ
.
The purpose of the decomposition is to test the prediction of the theoretical model
in Chapter 1 and to quantify the importance of the different effects. I now discuss each
effect, and its expected theoretical sign. The direct effect takes all firms’ decisions as given
and has two positive components: the first captures the productivity gain of exporters
which lose less output from exporting, and the second captures the additional return
from innovation by exporters that now face lower trade costs. The indirect effect has five
components: the first three correspond to the selection effect described in Melitz (2003),
whereas the last two correspond to the change in innovation. As for the selection effect, the
first component corresponds to a drop in trade costs inducing the exit of less productive
firms, implying the entry effect should be negative. The second and third components
have to do with the reallocation of market shares between the remaining domestic and
exporting firms. Less productive firms lose market share to more productive exporting
firms, hence the domestic indirect effect should be negative, and the exporters indirect
effect positive. As for the innovation effect, it can be decomposed into the intensive and
extensive margin of innovation. The innovation intensity increases with the participation
in foreign markets, and thus the effect through the intensive margin of innovation of the
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exporters innovators should be positive. For the extensive margin, the theory predicts that
the effect can be positive or negative. In the low cost trade equilibrium and the intermediate
equilibrium, all innovators are exporting. In that case a decrease in iceberg trade costs
increases the incentives to be an exporter (and to be an exporter innovator), so that the
effect through the extensive margin of innovation should be positive.
In the low cost innovation equilibrium, innovation happens by both exporting and
domestic firms. Hence, while a decrease in iceberg trade costs increases the incentives
of exporters to innovate, for the domestic firms innovation becomes harder, as real wages
are pushed up. This implies that the productivity cutoff of domestic innovators moves to
the right, so that the effect through the extensive margin of innovation will be negative.
Table 2.5 shows the elasticity of each component with respect to a decrease in variable
trade costs in the five countries. All the elasticities have the predicted signs. A decrease
in iceberg trade costs induces in all countries an increase in total productivity. The direct
effect on exporting through innovation is stronger the more closed the economy is, since
they react more strongly to variations in trade costs. There is a negative effect through
the entry of firms, and through the loss of market share by domestic firms, while there
is a positive effect coming from the gain in market share by exporting firms, and the
intensive margin of innovation. Finally, as predicted, the extensive margin of innovation
has a positive effect in the economies that are in the low cost trade equilibrium or intermediate
equilibrium, while it is negative in the low cost innovation equilibrium economies.
Atkeson and Burstein (2010) predict that although a drop in iceberg trade costs changes
individual firms’ decisions, the total indirect effect is essentially zero. In contrast, my
simulations show that this is not always the case. If the effect through the extensive margin
is small, as in the case of U.K., then the indirect effect on total productivity is close to 0,
since the response through the intensive margin of innovation is offset by the changes
in firms’ exit. However, if the effect through the extensive margin is large, as happens in
Spain, this is no longer the case, and the indirect effect substantially differs from zero.
The difference between Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and my paper is that I have an
extensive margin of innovation. Taking into account the extensive margin is particularly
important in the low cost innovation equilibrium, where the number of total innovators in
the economy decreases after a reduction of trade costs, and therefore the impact on
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aggregate productivity is negative. However, in all the equilibria where the impact is
positive, since the number of innovators in the economy increases, the effect through
the extensive margin of innovation is quite small. Consistent with this, I observe that a
1% drop in trade costs leads to a reduction of 1.84% in innovating firms in Spain (the
only country in the low cost innovation equilibrium), whereas in Germany the number
of innovating firms increases only by 0.41%, hence I expect a larger effect through the
extensive margin of innovation in Spain than in Germany.
2.4.3 Lowering Fixed Costs of Trade and Innovation
The model described in Chapter 1 is particularly suitable to study the effectiveness
of trade and innovation policies. In this section I compare the response of aggregate
productivity to a decrease in fixed trade costs versus the response to a decrease in fixed
innovation costs. While much of the trade literature focuses on decreases in variable trade
costs, evaluating the effect of lowering fixed costs is also important. This is especially true
in model where firms take both export and innovation decisions.9
First, I will describe the effects of a drop in fixed trade costs and a drop in fixed
innovation costs on the decisions of the firms in the economy. Second, I will quantitatively
assess the elasticity of total productivity, and therefore welfare, to fixed costs. Third, I will
analyze the impact on aggregate productivity of a change in the economies’ equilibria as
a consequence of a large drop in fixed costs.
2.4.3.1 Effects on Firms’ Decisions of a Drop in Fixed Costs
A reduction in fixed trade costs increases the incentives to enter the export market. In the
low cost innovation equilibrium and the intermediate equilibrium this implies that there is an
increase in the firms that export and innovate. In the low cost trade equilibrium it implies
that more firms export but that less firms export and innovate. In this equilibrium, the
firms choosing whether to innovate or not are already exporting (and therefore are paying
the fixed export costs), so they only care about innovation costs and variable trade costs.
For them a drop in fixed trade costs lowers the incentives to innovate, since it induces
9 In a pure trade model, without innovation, lowering variable or fixed costs tend to have qualitatively similar
results on welfare. See (Melitz, 2003) for a more comprehensive explanation.
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more entry into the industry, reducing the price index, and lowering the profits coming
from innovation. In the next proposition I prove this latter result.
Proposition 7. In the low cost trade equilibrium, if fixed trade costs fall
1. The domestic cutoff increases ∂ϕD/∂fX < 0
2. The productivity cutoff for exporting decreases ∂ϕX/∂fX > 0
3. The productivity cutoff for exporting and innovation increases ∂ϕXI/∂fX < 0
Proof. Assume that G(ϕ) = 1 −
(
1
ϕ
)θ
. Differentiating Equation B.2 with respect to
fX and using ∂ϕX/∂fX = (ϕX/ϕD)∂ϕD/∂fX + [1/(σ− 1)]ϕX/fX and ∂ϕXI/∂fX =
(ϕXI/ϕD)∂ϕD/∂fX from Equation 1.14, Equation 1.15 and Equation 1.16 yields:
∂ϕLCTD
∂fX
=
n 1
ϕθX
−nfX
(
σ−1
θ−(σ−1)
)
θ
ϕθX
1
ϕD
− fI
(
(σ−1)(α+1α )
θ−(σ−1)(α+1α )
)
θ
ϕθXI
1
ϕD
< 0,
∂ϕLCTX
∂fX
=
1
θfX
−
fI
(
(σ−1)(α+1α )
θ−(σ−1)(α+1α )
)
θ
ϕθ+1XI
ϕXI
ϕX
nfX
(
σ−1
θ−(σ−1)
)
θ
ϕθ+1X
(
ϕX
ϕD
)
∂ϕD
∂fX
> 0,
∂ϕLCTXI
∂fX
=
(
ϕXI
ϕD
)
∂ϕD
∂fX
< 0.
Similarly, a reduction in fixed innovation costs increases the incentives to start
innovating. In the low cost trade equilibrium and the intermediate equilibrium this implies
that there is an increase in the firms that export and innovate (because all innovators are
exporting). In the low cost innovation equilibrium, it implies that more firms innovate but
that less firms export and innovate. A drop in fixed innovation costs lowers the incentives
to export, since it induces more entry into the industry, reducing the price index, and the
profits coming from exporting.
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2.4.3.2 Elasticity of Total Productivity to Fixed Costs
Table 2.6 reports the elasticity of aggregate productivity with respect to a reduction in the
fixed costs of trade and innovation, and compares them to the elasticity of aggregate
productivity with respect to a reduction in the marginal trade cost. The aggregate
productivity of the economy responds much more strongly to a change in marginal trade
costs than to a change in fixed trade costs or fixed innovation costs. While the elasticities
with respect to the fixed costs are both small, there are significant differences between
them.
France Germany Italy Spain U.K.
Ψ,τ 0.643 0.642 0.806 0.65 0.597
Ψ,fX −0.0156 0.0124 0.0578 0.0374 −0.0197
Ψ,fI 0.0129 0.0078 0.0155 0.0174 0.0030
Table 2.6: Effects of a Small Reduction in τ, fX, and fI.
On the one hand, the elasticity of aggregate productivity with respect to the fixed
innovation costs is very similar across countries and always positive. For countries in the
low cost trade or the intermediate equilibrium, lower fixed innovation costs imply more
firms exporting and innovating. However, in the low cost innovation equilibrium, which
characterizes Spain, there are two opposing effects. While the cost of innovating has
dropped, there is the negative effect coming from a reduction in the incentives to export,
so that the number of exporters innovators falls. As can be seen from Table 2.6, the direct
positive effect more than offsets the negative effect, so that the overall productivity (and
welfare) increases in Spain.
On the other hand, the elasticity of aggregate productivity with respect to fixed trade
costs is in absolute terms greater than the elasticity with respect to fixed innovation
costs, therefore a decrease in fixed trade costs appears to be more effective than a
decrease in fixed innovation costs. However, the response of aggregate productivity to
a drop in fixed export costs is negative in two countries, France, and United Kingdom.
Both economies are in the low cost trade equilibrium, and Proposition 7 shows that a
reduction in fixed trade costs increases the incentives to enter the export market, but
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lowers the incentives to innovate. The intuition is that the increased presence of foreign
firms pushes up real wages, which reduces the number of innovators, and the intensity
of the remaining innovators. Since the investment in innovation decreases, so do the total
revenues (and profits) of these firms. Therefore, there is a reallocation of market shares
from the most productive firms in the economy towards slightly less productive firms
(the new exporters), which lowers the total productivity of the economy, and therefore
welfare.10
2.4.3.3 Effect on productivity from large changes in fixed costs
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show the response of total productivity to larger changes in
fixed trade costs and fixed innovation costs.
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Figure 2.1: Change in Total Productivity and Fixed Trade Costs
10 Monopolistic competition between firms implies that the equilibria are not efficient in terms of Pareto, and
therefore, it is possible that a reduction in some costs decreases welfare.
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Figure 2.2: Change in Total Productivity and Fixed Innovation Costs
On the horizontal axes are the fixed costs (in reverse order, from high to low) and
on the vertical axes is the variation in total productivity with respect to the initial
total productivity. An upward-sloping schedule for a given country implies that total
productivity (and therefore also welfare) increases when fixed costs drop. For each
country the starting point is their initial fixed costs, and I only consider decreases.
Several facts stand out in these two figures. First, the response of productivity to
changes in fixed trade costs is stronger than the response to changes in fixed innovation
costs. Second, if the economy is in the low cost trade equilibrium, the total productivity
decreases as fixed trade costs decrease. This is the case of France and United Kingdom.
Third, if fixed innovation costs decrease, total productivity increases the most if the
economy is the low cost innovation equilibrium. This the case of Spain. These three facts
are similar to the ones found when computing the elasticities in Table 2.6.
However, the figures also reveal that the largest changes in productivity happen when
countries move from one equilibrium to another as a consequence of the drop in fixed
costs. This is especially relevant if the movement from one equilibrium to another has a
big impact on the number of firms in the economy. These changes in productivity can be
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positive or negative, large or small, therefore studying what drives them is important to
be able to asses the effectiveness of innovation policies and trade policies.
If the fixed trade cost drops sufficiently, Spain goes from the low cost innovation
equilibrium to the intermediate equilibrium. In Figure 2.1 this change in equilibrium shows
up as a large upward spike. In this transition 8% of the firms in the economy exit. This
negative effect is more than compensated by an increase of 29% in the productivity of the
economy when ignoring changes on the entry of firms. The large productivity increase is
due to domestic innovators becoming exporting innovators thanks to the increased ease
of entering the export market.
Similarly, if the fixed cost of innovation drops sufficiently, Italy and Germany also
change equilibrium, this time in the other direction, from the intermediate equilibrium to
the low cost innovation equilibrium. Once again, this shows up as a large spike in Figure 2.2.
Since trade becomes relatively more expensive, after the transition there are less exporter
innovators and more firms enter in the domestic market. The loss through the exporter
innovators dominates the entry of more firms in the economy, hence the spike down in
both economies during the change. Finally, notice that once in the the low cost innovation
equilibrium, the total productivity starts increasing again.
But there are other shifts in equilibria. For example, if the fixed trade cost drops
sufficiently, Germany goes from the intermediate equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium.
And if the fixed cost of innovation drops sufficiently, France and United Kingdom go from
the low cost trade equilibrium to the intermediate equilibrium. In all these cases, the change
between equilibria is smooth and only the slopes change. In Figure 2.1, when Germany
transitions to the low cost trade equilibrium, the trend becomes negative, although there are
still gains in productivity with respect to the initial productivity since it is now in a more
open economy. The negative effect is consistent with Proposition 7, where a decrease in
fixed trade costs induces losses both through the extensive and the intensive margins of
innovation. Note that France and the United Kingdom, which are already in the low cost
trade equilibrium, display a similar behavior, whereby a drop in fixed trade costs lowers
total productivity. However, since both of them are already in a very export-oriented
economy, there are no gains with respect to the initial productivity, and the decrease
translates in a drop in productivity.
If I turn to the opposite case, going from the low cost trade equilibrium to the intermediate
equilibrium, as France and United Kingdom do in Figure 2.2, I see that both countries
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react differently. While there is an increase of total productivity in France with respect to
the initial situation, in the United Kingdom the trend is negative and if fixed innovation
costs are low enough, the total productivity decreases with respect to the initial situation.
The decrease in fixed innovation costs induces firms to become exporters innovators,
increasing the market shares of these firms while the most inefficient exit the economy.
While in France the positive effect through the reallocation of market shares towards the
more efficient firms dominates the negative effect through the exit of firms, in the United
Kingdom it is the negative effect through the exit of firms which dominates.
Summarizing, Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 reveal that a drop in fixed trade costs is
more effective in raising productivity (and welfare) than a drop in fixed innovation costs.
Depending on the country, it can induce productivity gains from 1% to 20% in total, and
only if the economy is already very open might a further drop in fixed trade costs be
damaging to the economy. In contrast, a fixed innovation cost drop has little effect on the
productivity, the maximum increase being around 2%, and if it induces economies to be
less export-oriented, then the productivity might decrease by up to 7%.
2.5 extensions
In this section I examine two particular cases of my model: the case where all the firms
in the economy innovate and the case where all the firms in the economy can adopt
a predetermined innovation. By closing down the extensive margin of innovation or
the intensive margin of innovation as channels through which trade indirectly affects
aggregate productivity, not only can I analyze better the role each channel has in the
previous findings, but also the importance of studying them jointly.
First, I present the results under the assumption that there is no extensive margin of
innovation. Then, I present the results under the assumption that there is no intensive
margin of innovation. Finally, I discuss the importance of jointly analyzing the extensive
and intensive margins of innovation.
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2.5.1 No Extensive Margin of Innovation
I examine the quantitative results under the assumption that all the firms in the economy
innovate. Thus, I eliminate the extensive margin of innovation as channel through which
trade can indirectly affect the aggregate productivity of an economy. Closing this channel
but allowing firms to differ in the intensity of innovation enables us to study the
importance of the extensive margin of innovation for the quantitative results exposed
above.
First, I describe the characteristics of the model under the assumption that all firms in
the economy innovate. Second, I reevaluate the effects of a decrease in variable trade costs
and a decrease in fixed trade costs in the aggregate productivity of the economy. Finally,
I compare these results with those from the general model to analyze what the extensive
margin of innovation adds to the policy analysis.
2.5.1.1 Theoretical Model
The model is based on the framework proposed in Chapter 1, which I simplify to allow
all the firms of the economy to engage in process innovation. This model is similar
conceptually to Vannoorenberghe (2008), Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and Rubini (2011).
The set up of the economy is the same as the one described in Chapter 1, but I assume
that there are no fixed cost of innovation (fI = 0). Then to set an innovation level z(ϕ),
firms must incur c(z(ϕ)) units of labor, where:
c(z(ϕ)) = z(ϕ)α+1 α > 0.
The timing in this economy is as follows. In a first stage, as in Melitz (2003), entering
the market means paying a labor sunk cost fE in order to get a draw of the productivity
parameter ϕ. In the second stage, with the knowledge of their own productivity, firms
decide how much to innovate and whether to export or not. Since exporting requires
paying a labor fixed cost, fX, but innovating does not require any labor fixed costs, there
will be two types of firms in the open economy: Type DI firms innovate but are active only
in the domestic market; and Type XI firms innovate and are active in the domestic and
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foreign markets. Finally, in the third stage, firms choose prices. I solve the firms problem
through backward induction.
To make the joint decision of whether to enter the foreign markets or not, and taking
into account that the presence of foreign markets affects the firms’ innovation, firms will
choose the option that yields the highest profits.11
− Profits of a domestic innovator firm (Type DI):
piDI =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1zD (ϕ) − fD − c (zD (ϕ)) .
− Profits of an exporter innovator firm (Type XI):
piXI =
(
1+nτ1−σ
) R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1zX (ϕ) −nfX − fD − c (zX (ϕ)) .
Where zD(ϕ) =
[
1
α+1
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
] 1
α
, and zX(ϕ) =
[
1+nτ1−σ
] 1
α zD(ϕ).
Proposition 8. The economy is in equilibrium, ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
DI, if the following conditions hold:
1. Zero profit condition : piDI(ϕ∗DI) = 0
2. Exporting profit condition: piXI(ϕ∗XI) − piDI(ϕ
∗
XI) = 0
3. Free entry condition: 1δ
[∫ϕ∗XI
ϕ∗DI
piDI(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
∫∞
ϕ∗XI
piXI(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
]
= fE
4. There is selection into exporting: nfX
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
> fD
2.5.1.2 Counterfactuals
The key variable of the quantitative analysis is the aggregate productivity. In this economy,
the aggregate productivity and the aggregate welfare of the economy, Ψ and W, are
defined as:
Ψ =
Q
Lp
=
[
M
(
ΨDI + (1+nτ
1−σ)
α+1
α ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1
; (2.3)
11 To ease the mathematics and have closed form solutions, I modify the gains from innovation of the baseline
model in Chapter 1 from (1+ z(ϕ))
1
σ−1 to z(ϕ)
1
σ−1 .
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W =
Q
L
=
(
σ− 1
σ
)[
M
(
ΨDI + (1+nτ
1−σ)
α+1
α ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1
; (2.4)
where ΨDI =
∫ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ) and ΨXI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α
α+1)dG(ϕ).
The purpose of the counterfactual is to understand how the extensive margin of
innovation determined the results from the quantitative exercises. Thus, I do not
re-calibrate the model, and use instead the calibrated parameters in Table 2.3. Given this
parameters, I decompose the effects of a decrease of variable trade costs and analyze a
decrease of fixed trade costs in aggregate productivity for Germany, Italy and Spain. For
France and United Kingdom, if there are no fixed innovation costs and all firms innovate,
the calibrated parameters suggest that all the firms in the economy would export and
innovate. Since I am interested in the joint decision of innovation and exporting, we
exclude these two countries in the analysis.
decrease of variable trade costs
The effect of a decrease in variable trade costs on aggregate productivity, can be
decomposed using a first order approximation into a direct effect and an indirect effect.
The direct effect takes all firms’ decisions as given, and simply measures the productivity
gains from trade being less wasteful because of the change in trade costs. Notice that
the magnitude of this direct effect is determined simply by the share of exports in
production and is independent of changes in decisions, whereas the indirect effect arises
from changes in firms’ entry, export, and innovation decisions, which are themselves
responding to the change in trade costs. More formally, from equation Equation 2.3, the
change in aggregate productivity from a change in variable trade costs is
∆logΨ = −
α+ 1
α
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
sXI∆logτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect
+
1
σ− 1
(1− sXI)∆logΨDI + sXI∆logΨXI︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity
+∆logM︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect
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where sXI is the share of export production in the value of production.
The indirect effect of a change in trade costs on aggregate productivity itself has two
components. The first component is the indirect effect of a change in trade costs on the
productivity of the average firm, and the second component is the indirect effect of a
change in the number of firms active in the economy.
Table 2.7 shows the elasticity of each component with respect to a decrease in variable
trade costs. The change in the productivity of the average firm includes any gain/loss that
may happen through the intensive margin of innovation. Notice that the indirect effect
is always negligible, because the gains from the changes in productivity are offset by the
loss through the exit of firms, just like Atkeson and Burstein (2010) predict. The extensive
margin of innovation is key to explain why the indirect effect of a change in trade costs
may not be always negligible.
Furthermore, the size of the total effect is considerably smaller in this set up, where if
the indirect effect through the extensive margin of innovation is not considered, than in
the general model (see Table 2.5). However, they are quite close to the elasticities reported
by Atkeson and Burstein (2010) to whom we compare, which indicates that the intensity
of innovation may not be as relevant as the extensive margin of innovation to have a large
impact in productivity through a decrease in trade costs.
Germany Italy Spain
Total Effect 0.077 0.067 0.041
Direct Effect 0.070 0.066 0.041
Indirect Effect 0.007 0.001 0.000
Entry −1.407 −2.054 −1.026
Productivity 1.414 2.055 1.026
Table 2.7: Elasticities Lowering Iceberg Trade Costs 1%
decrease of fixed trade costs
Figure 2.3 shows the response of aggregate productivity to large changes in fixed trade
costs. On the horizontal axis are the fixed trade costs (in reverse order, from high to
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low) and on the vertical axis are the variation in productivity with respect to the initial
total productivity. An upward-sloping schedule for a given country implies that total
productivity increases when fixed costs drop. For each country the starting point is their
initial fixed costs, I only consider decreases and only consider the economy as long as the
parameter conditions specified in Proposition 8 hold.
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Figure 2.3: Change in Total Productivity and Fixed Trade Costs (No Extensive Margin)
In comparison to the response to a drop in fixed trade costs in the general model (see
Figure 2.1), two things stand out if we only consider the intensive margin of innovation.
First, the effect of a drop in fixed trade costs on total productivity is always positive.
Second, the effect is more subdued in Spain and more pronounced in Germany, making
the whole effect more homogeneous among the countries. That is, the differences in the
aggregate productivity gains after a drop in fixed trade costs is smaller than when we
consider both the extensive and intensive margin of innovation. This suggests that the
presence of an extensive margin of innovation may play a key role in the differences we
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observed earlier, and thus for some economies it might be more important than for others
to affect such margin through a trade policy.
2.5.2 No Intensive Margin of Innovation
I now examine the quantitative results under the assumption that firms can choose
to adopt a better technology, and this innovative technology is predetermined. Thus,
I eliminate the intensive margin of innovation as channel through which trade can
indirectly affect the aggregate productivity of an economy. Closing this channel but
allowing firms to freely choose between adopting or not the “better” technology enables
us to study the importance of the intensive margin of innovation for the quantitative
results exposed above.
First, I describe the characteristics of the model under the assumption that firms in the
economy can choose to adopt a predetermined innovative technology. Second, I reevaluate
the effects of a decrease in variable trade costs and a decrease in fixed trade costs in the
aggregate productivity of the economy. Finally, I compare these results with those from
the general model to analyze what the intensive margin of innovation adds to the policy
analysis.
2.5.2.1 Theoretical Model
The model is based on the framework proposed in Chapter 1, which I simplify to let firms
choose between two technologies — the innovative or the baseline technology. This model
is similar conceptually to Navas-Ruiz and Sala (2007), Costantini and Melitz (2008) and
Bustos (2011).
Innovating or adopting the innovative technology allows firms to increase their
marginal productivity with respect to the baseline technology, but comes at the expense
of incurring an implementation cost. The increase in productivity, which I denote z¯,
is independent of the firm’s size and of the presence of foreign markets, that is, the
productivity increase of a firm that innovates is the same regardless of their export
activities. The adoption of the innovative technology requires paying a fixed labor cost,
which I denote fI. The rest of economy’s set up is the same as the one described in
Chapter 1.
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The timing in this economy is as follows. In a first stage, as in Melitz (2003), entering
the market means paying a labor sunk cost fE in order to get a draw of the productivity
parameter ϕ. In the second stage, with the knowledge of their own productivity, firms
decide whether to export or not and whether to innovate or not. Since exporting and
innovating require paying a labor fixed cost, fX and fI, there will be four types of firms
in the open economy: Type D firms are active only in the domestic market and do not
innovate; Type DI firms are active only in the domestic market and innovate; and Type X
firms are active in the domestic and foreign markets but do not innovate. and Type XI
firms are active in the domestic and foreign markets and innovate. Finally, in the third
stage, firms choose prices. I solve the firms’ problem through backward induction.
To make the joint decision of whether to enter the foreign markets or not and whether
to innovate or not, and taking into account that the level of innovation does not change
with the participation in foreign markets, firms will choose the option that yields the
highest profits.
− Profits of a domestic non-innovator firm (Type D):
piD =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 − fD.
− Profits of a domestic innovator firm (Type DI):
piDI =
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 (1+ z¯) − fD − fI.
− Profits of an exporter non-innovator firm (Type X):
piX =
(
1+nτ1−σ
) R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 −nfX − fD.
− Profits of an exporter innovator firm (Type XI):
piXI =
(
1+nτ1−σ
) R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
ϕσ−1 (1+ z¯) −nfX − fD − fI.
In equilibrium, there are three possible firm type distributions depending on the
relation between the cost-benefit ratio of innovation and the exporting costs. The three
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equilibria are similar to the ones described in Section 1.3.2 (which are summarized in
Table 1.1). Table 2.8 summarizes all the possible equilibria in the open economy, the firm
type distributions, and the parameter restrictions associated to each one when firms can
choose to adopt a predetermined innovative technology.
Equilibrium Firms’ Type Distribution Conditions
Low Cost Innovation
Equilibrium
Type D - Type DI - Type
XI
(
ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
DI > ϕ
∗
D
) τσ−1fX > fI (1+z¯)z¯&
fI
z¯ > fD
Intermediate
Equilibrium
Type D - Type XI(
ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
D
)
fI
(1+z¯)
z¯ > τσ−1fX
&
τσ−1fX > fIz¯(1+nτ1−σ) > fD
Low Cost Trade
Equilibrium
Type D - Type X - Type XI(
ϕ∗XI > ϕ
∗
X > ϕ
∗
D
) fI
z¯(1+nτ1−σ)
> τσ−1fX > fD
Table 2.8: Equilibria in the Open Economy with a “fixed” innovative techonology
2.5.2.2 Counterfactuals
The key variable of the quantitative analysis is the aggregate productivity. In this economy,
the aggregate productivity and welfare of the economy, Ψ and W, are defined as:
ΨLCIE =
QLCIE
Lp
=
[
M
(
ΨD + z¯ΨDI + (1+nτ
1−σ)(1+ z¯)ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1 ; (2.5)
ΨIE =
QIE
Lp
=
[
M
(
ΨD + (1+nτ
1−σ)(1+ z¯)ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1 ; (2.6)
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ΨLCTE =
QLCTE
Lp
=
[
M
(
ΨD + (1+nτ
1−σ)ΨX + (1+nτ
1−σ)z¯ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1 ; (2.7)
W =
Q
L
=
(
σ− 1
σ
)
Ψ; (2.8)
where ΨD =
∫ϕX
ϕD
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ), ΨDI =
∫ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ), ΨX =
∫∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ), ΨXI =∫∞
ϕXI
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ), and the superscripts LCIE, IE and LCTE refer to, respectively, the
low cost innovation equilibrium, the intermediate equilibrium, and the low cost trade
equilibrium.
In the counterfactuals below, I decompose the effects of a decrease of variable trade
costs and analyze a decrease of fixed trade costs in aggregate productivity. The purpose of
the counterfactuals is to understand how the extensive margin of innovation determined
the results from the quantitative exercises. Thus, I do not re-calibrate the model, and use
instead the calibrated parameters in Table 2.3. Furthermore, I set the innovation step z¯ to
0.5, matching the productivity increase of 20% suggested by Costantini and Melitz (2008).
In Table 2.9 can be seen the predicted equilibria each economy is in given the calibrated
parameters in Table 2.3 and the innovation step.
Country Predicted Equilibrium
France Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
Germany Intermediate Equilibrium
Italy Intermediate Equilibrium
Spain Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
United Kingdom Low Cost Trade Equilibrium
Table 2.9: Predicted Equilibrium
decrease of variable trade costs
The effect of a decrease in variable trade costs on aggregate productivity, can be
decomposed using a first order approximation into a direct effect and an indirect effect.
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The direct effect takes all firms’ decisions as given, and simply measures the productivity
gains from trade being less wasteful because of the change in trade costs. Notice that
the magnitude of this direct effect is determined simply by the share of exports in
production and is independent of changes in decisions, whereas the indirect effect arises
from changes in firms’ entry, export, and innovation decisions, which are themselves
responding to the change in trade costs. More formally, from equations Equation 2.5 to
Equation 2.7, the change in aggregate productivity from a change in variable trade costs
is generally
∆logΨ = −
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
(sX + z¯sXI)∆logτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect
+
1
σ− 1
sD∆logΨD + z¯sDI∆logΨDI + sX∆logΨX + z¯sXI∆logΨXI︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity
+∆logM︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect
where sD is the share of domestic firms’ production in the value of production, sDI is the
share of domestic innovators firms’ production in the value of production (which will be
zero in the intermediate equilibrium and the low cost trade equilibrium), sX is the share
of export firms’ production in the value of production (which will be zero in the low cost
innovation equlibrium and the intermediate equilibrium) and sXI is the share of export
production in the value of production.
The indirect effect of a change in trade costs on aggregate productivity itself has two
components. The first component is the indirect effect of a change in trade costs on the
productivity of the average firm, and the second component is the indirect effect of a
change in the number of firms active in the economy.
Table 2.10 shows the elasticity of each component with respect to a decrease in variable
trade costs. The change in the productivity of the average firm includes any gain/loss that
may happen through the extensive margin of innovation. Notice that the indirect effect
is not negligible for the cases of Germany, Italy and Spain which are in the intermediate
equilibrium and the low cost innovation equilibrium. Particularly, in these countries the
gains from the changes in productivity are more than offset by the loss through the exit of
firms. In comparison to the results in the general model (see Table 2.5), the non-negligible
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indirect effects are now present in countries in the intermediate equilibrium as well.
A decrease in variable trade costs induces some firms to both export and adopt the
innovative technology, but at the same time, the increased competition reduces the gains
from the domestic firms in the economy and induces the less productive of them to exit.
In the general model, the existence of the intensive margin of innovation channel implied
that a decrease in variable trade costs had an impact in the innovation performed by
the firms. The positive effect through the intensive margin of innovation is missing here,
which explains the differences in the indirect effect.
Furthermore, if only the extensive margin of innovation is considered, instead of both
the extensive and intensive margins of innovation, then the strong negative effect from
the indirect effect may offset the positiveness from the direct effect. And therefore, we
may wrongly conclude that a decrease in variable trade costs does not have an effect on
aggregate productivity.
France Germany Italy Spain U.K.
Total Effect 0.439 −0.009 −0.003 0.037 0.456
Direct Effect 0.430 0.246 0.402 0.181 0.445
Indirect Effect 0.009 −0.255 −0.405 −0.144 0.011
Entry −0.961 −0.512 −0.861 −0.144 −0.995
Re-allocation 0.970 0.256 0.456 0.001 1.006
Equilibrium LCT IE IE LCI LCT
Table 2.10: Elasticities Lowering Iceberg Trade Costs 1%
decrease of fixed trade costs
Figure 2.4 shows the response of aggregate productivity to large changes in fixed trade
costs. On the horizontal axes is the fixed trade costs (in reverse order, from high to
low) and on the vertical axes is the variation in productivity with respect to the initial
total productivity. An upward-sloping schedule for a given country implies that total
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productivity increases when fixed costs drop. For each country the starting point is their
initial fixed costs, and I only consider decreases.
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Figure 2.4: Change in Total Productivity and Fixed Trade Costs (No Intensive Margin)
In comparison to the response to a drop in fixed trade costs in the general model (see
Figure 2.1), two things stand out if we only consider the intensive margin of innovation.
First, the effect of a drop in fixed trade costs on total productivity is always positive when
firms remain within an equilibrium, even in the low cost trade equilibrium. Second, large
changes in productivity happen when countries move from one equilibrium to another
as a consequence of the drop in fixed trade costs, and this changes in productivity are
always large.
If the fixed trade costs drops sufficiently, Spain goes from the low cost innovation
equilibrium to the intermediate equilibrium. In Figure 2.4 this change in equilibrium
shows up as a large upward spike. In this transition 11% of the firms in the economy
exit, but the negative effect is more than compensated by an increase of 48% in the
productivity of the economy when ignoring changes on the entry of firms. The large
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productivity increase is due to domestic innovators becoming exporting innovators thanks
to the increased ease of entering the export market. This effect is exactly the same we
observed in the general specification.
Similarly, if the fixed cost of trade drops sufficiently, Italy and Germany also change
equilibrium from the intermediate equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium.
Differently than before, in Figure 2.4 this change in equilibrium shows up as a large
downward spike. In this transition 43% and 34% of the firms in Germany and Italy
respectively exit, but the negative effect is not compensated by an increase in the
productivity of the economy when ignoring changes on the entry of firms. This effect
is completely opposite to the one observed in the general specification which highlights
the importance of the intensive margin of innovation to curve the negative effects from
transitioning from the intermediate equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium.
2.5.3 The benefits of analyzing jointly the extensive and intensive margins of innovation.
There are substantial differences in the effects of trade policies in aggregate productivity
when considering a trade model of heterogenous firms with innovation where there
is both an extensive and intensive margin of innovation, only an intensive margin of
innovation or just an extensive margin of innovation.
First, changes in firms’ decisions regarding entry, exit export and innovation after a
drop in variable trade costs are non-negligible only if we consider that not all the firms in
the economy innovate. That is, if there are changes in the extensive margin of innovation
driven by a drop in variable trade costs. However, the presence of the intensive margin of
innovation in the analysis is key to not underestimate the total effect of a drop in variable
trade cost on aggregate productivity.
Second, the response of aggregate productivity to a drop in fixed trade costs leads to
large differences in the transition from one equilibrium to another when we consider only
the extensive margin of innovation. These large differences are smoothed by the effects
through the intensive margin of innovation. In the case of a change from the intermediate
equilibrium to the low cost trade equilibrium, the positive effect from the intensive margin
of innovation completely smooths the transition in the general setting. In the case of a
change from the low cost innovation equilibrium to the intermediate equilibrium, the
effect through the intensive margin of innovation dampens the large difference present
73
trade , innovation and productivity : a quantitative analysis of europe
when we only consider the extensive margin of innovation, but not enough to have a
smooth transition.
Finally, if effects through the extensive and intensive margin of innovation are not
consider jointly, then a drop in fixed trade costs appears to lead to an increase in the
total productivity. However, when considered jointly and if an economy is in the low cost
trade equilibrium, this is no longer the case. In the joint analysis, the lose of market shares
from the more productive firms of the economy is amplified by the intensive margin of
innovation, thus the negative effect through the reallocation of market shares towards
less productive firms of the economy is greater than in an economy without an intensive
margin of innovation.
2.6 conclusions
Chapter 1 proposed a trade model with heterogeneous firms that decide not just whether
or how much to export but also whether or how much to innovate. By incorporating the
extensive and intensive margins of trade and innovation, three equilibria may arise. In all
equilibria high-productivity firms export and innovate, whereas low-productivity neither
export nor innovate. What differs across equilibria is the behavior of medium-productivity
firms. In an economy with trade costs that are low relative to innovation costs,
medium-productivity firms export without innovating, whereas in an economy with
trade costs that are high relative to innovation costs, medium-productivity firms
innovate without exporting. In a third equilibrium, in between the other two, some
medium-productivity firms export and innovate, whereas others do neither.
In this paper I have shown that these equlibria are empirically plausible by calibrating
the model to five European countries. The numerical exercises reveal the importance
of considering both the intensive and extensive margin of innovation to understand
the interdependence between trade and innovation. More generally, the effect of trade
liberalization on productivity and welfare depends crucially on the equilibrium the
economy is in. A standard result in the literature is that the aggregate productivity effect
of a drop in variable trade costs on firms’ decisions to exit, export and innovate is minimal.
In my setup this is also true in most equilibria, but not in the low cost innovation equilibrium.
In that case a drop in variable trade costs has a negative impact on the extensive margin
of innovation, thus lowering the overall positive effect of trade liberalization.
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In addition to analyzing a drop in variable trade costs, I also assessed the impact of
a drop in fixed trade costs and fixed innovation costs. Once again, although in most
equilibria these policies lead to an improvement in aggregate productivity and welfare,
this is not always the case. For example, in the low cost trade equilibrium, a drop in
fixed trade costs increases the number of exporters, making innovating more expensive.
This lowers both the number of innovators and the intensity of innovation, leading to a
reduction in aggregate productivity and welfare.
These findings stress the importance of having a model that jointly analyzes the
extensive and intensive margins of both trade and innovation. Not doing so would not
just result in a less rich theoretical structure, it would also keep us from correctly assessing
the impact of different policies aimed at fomenting trade and innovation.
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U N D E R S TA N D I N G C O M P E T I T I V E N E S S
joint with Rubén Segura-Cayuela
Abstract. Using firm level data, we analyze the factors that drive the evolution of the
aggregate Unit Labor Costs — the main European competitiveness indicator — in France,
Germany, Italy and Spain. The evolution of the aggregate Unit Labor Cost is not driven
by the evolution of the firm level Unit Labor Costs, but rather by an important factor for
the competitiveness of a country: the reallocation of resources among the firms of the
economy. Using the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), we show the importance
of an efficient allocation of resources for productivity gains.
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3.1 introduction
3.1 introduction
The latest world crisis and the increase of debt in Europe have reopened in the last few
years a debate forgotten in the good times, the competitiveness of an economy. Currently
the relevant measure of competitiveness in the European Union is the evolution of unit
labor costs. The unit labor cost is a macroeconomic aggregate that measures the labor cost
per unit of product and is calculated as the ratio of total labor costs to real output. A rise
in labor costs higher than the rise in labor productivity may be a threat to an economy’s
cost competitiveness if other costs are not adjusted in compensation.
The use of aggregate price-cost based indicators, like the unit labor costs, may not be
informative enough to determine the competitiveness of a country. For example, Spain’s
aggregate unit labor cost has grown faster than in the other European countries in the
last decade. Then, we should see a decrease in the world’s export shares reflecting the
decrease in the ability to sell their products. However, the exports shares have decreased
less than those of the other European countries. This “Spanish paradox” is explained
by the different relative weight of firms in the unit labor costs and the economy’s total
exports. Firms that export are usually the largest and most productive of the economy
(Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Bradford Jensen (1999)), and they account for the
main share of firms that export. However, for the aggregate unit labor cost all the firms in
the economy are taken into account, not just the exporters. Recent literature in industrial
organization and international trade (di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) and Bernard et al.
(2011)) has provided abundant empirical evidence supporting the idea that the evolution
of macroeconomic aggregates is determined closely by the decisions and characteristics of
the firms in the economy, and in particular by the behavior and productivity of a subgroup
of them: the most productive ones. Then, an adequate competitiveness measure should
be able to take into account the role of firms and their heterogeneity.
In this paper, we analyze the ability of the aggregate unit labor costs evolution to
capture adequately the firm heterogeneity of a country. We calculate, using firm level
data, a weighted change of the aggregate unit labor costs between 2002 and 2007 for four
European countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The components of the weighted
average are then decomposed according to a Laspeyres decomposition into three main
elements: the first captures changes in firm-level unit labor costs, keeping the initial
domestic market shares of firms constant; the second quantifies the reallocation of market
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shares within the domestic economy, keeping the initial unit labor costs constant; and
the third measures the interaction between the first two. If the aggregate ULC was a
measure that captured adequately the heterogeneity existent at the firm level ULC, its
evolution should be driven by the evolution of the firm level ULC. Then we should
observe the within component to be the most relevant in the explanation of the aggregate
ULC evolution.
The results reveal that the evolution of the firm-level unit labor cost does not explain
the evolution of the aggregate unit labor costs, rather it is the resource reallocation and
the interaction effect that explain around 90% of the changes in ULCs for all the countries
in the sample. Furthermore, Germany is the country that presents a greater reallocation
of resources in the period 2002 to 2007. In comparison with Germany, the lower resource
reallocation led to competitiveness losses of around 4.3% in the case of France, 6.4% in
Italy and 8% in Spain.
Motivated by the significant role of the reallocation of resources to explain the evolution
of the aggregate ULC, we apply the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to explain
how much of the differences in productivity in Europe is due to an inefficient allocation
of resources. As a result of distortions that affect production, firms produce different
amounts than what would be dictated by their productivity. In order to determine the
gains from an efficient allocation of resources, we calculate the hypothetical “efficient”
output in each country — the output if these distortions did not exist — and compare it
with actual output levels.
An efficient allocation of resources would boost aggregate manufacturing TFP in
2008 by 22.7% in France, 27.9% in Germany, 43.5% in Italy and 28.2% in Spain. More
interestingly, we observe that over the period of 2002 to 2008, the “misallocation” of
resources decreases in Germany, remains fairly constant in France and increases in Italy
and Spain. This is actually consistent with the higher reallocation of resources present in
the evolution of Germany’s aggregate unit labor costs, which is followed by France, Italy
and Spain.
Our empirical analysis of the unit labor costs as a competitiveness measure reveals
the need to open the “black boxes” that the macroeconomic indicators often are, by
using firm level data to understand clearly what are the driving factors behind their
evolution. While the evolution of the aggregate unit labor cost does not reflect adequately
the evolution of the firm level unit labor costs, and therefore does not capture the firm
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heterogeneity present in an economy, it highlights the importance of the reallocation of
resources between firms in an economy. Our results suggest that an efficient reallocation
of resources leads to productivity gains of at least 20% in all countries. Attending to the
definition of Porter (1990), the competitiveness of a nation is the productivity with which
a nation utilizes its human, capital and natural resources. Therefore, our results indicate
that the evolution of the ULC is driven by an important factor for the competitiveness of
a country.
This paper contributes to the competitiveness literature by showing that the evolution
of the aggregate unit labor costs is driven by the reallocation of resources in the
economy, and by quantifying potential gains through an efficient reallocation of resources.
Our paper relates to two strands in the literature. First, the literature that studies the
effectiveness of aggregate macroeconomic indicators and their effectiveness to be used
as policy indicators ( Boone et al. (2007) and Felipe and Kumar (2011)). Boone et al.
(2007) claim that the use of the price cost margin as a competitiveness measure may
be potentially misleading since it tends to misrepresent the development of competition
over time in markets with few firms and high concentration. And Felipe and Kumar
(2011) analyze if the reduction of unit labor costs through a significant reduction in
nominal wages is the best policy to exit the current crisis for some countries of the
eurozone. Their analysis reveals that the aggregate unit labor costs reflects actually the
distribution of income between wages and profits, and that the unit capital costs have
also increased in the last decade. Therefore, a large reduction in nominal wages simply
will not solve the problem. Second, our paper is related to the literature that studies
the efficient allocation of resources. In particular, we follow the methodology of Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) who use micro data on manufacturing establishments to quantify the
potential extent of resource misallocation in China and India versus the United States.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the firm level
data used throughout the exercise. In Section 3.3, we discuss the traditional indicators
of competitiveness and their limitations, particularly regarding their inability to account
for the role of firms and their heterogeneity. In Section 3.4, we analyze if the aggregate
evolution of the unit labor costs captures adequately the evolution of the same variable
for the individual firms. In Section 3.5, we explain how much of the differences in
productivity and output is due to an inefficient allocation of resources. Section 3.6
concludes.
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3.2 data
We analyze balance sheet data from the AMADEUS dataset, managed by Bureau van Dijk,
which has been integrated with the EFIGE survey, a representative sample1 at the country
level for the manufacturing industry of several European economies.
The analysis is centered on France, Germany, Italy and Spain.2 While for the analysis
of the ULC only the cost of employees and the turnover of the firm are needed, the study
of the impact of an efficient reallocation of resources requires data both from the balance
sheet and the survey which we specify in detail later.
For each surveyed firm, nine years of usable balance sheet information has been
retrieved, from 2001 to 2009. France, Italy and Spain are the countries with best quality
in the balance sheet data, with a coverage3 of 88.6%, 86.86% and 90.56% respectively. For
Germany, the coverage is irregular. For the period of 2004-2008, there is a fairly good
coverage of 70% to 80% of the firms, however for the years 2001-2003 and 2009 it drops to
levels between 30-45% on average.
In Figure 3.1, we present the distribution of firms by employment size for all the
surveyed firms in EFIGE and the sample covered by the AMADEUS database.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Plant Size
1 Altomonte and Aquilante (2012) provide more information on the construction of the dataset and a
comprehensive set of validation measures .
2 In the EFIGE dataset there is also information about three more European countries: Austria, Hungary and
United Kingdom. Due to the poor quality of the balanced data for these countries, they have not been
included in the analysis.
3 The reference variable for the coverage is the turnover of the firm.
82
3.3 limitations of the traditional competitiveness indicators
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
 
2 4 6 8 10
 ln (employees) 
EFIGE
AMADEUS
(c) Italy
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
 
2 4 6 8 10
 ln (employees) 
EFIGE
AMADEUS
(d) Spain
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Firm Size (Cont.)
For all the countries with the exception of Germany, the firm size distribution of
the subsection of firms present in AMADEUS matches almost perfectly the firm size
distribution of the surveyed firms in EFIGE. Within the subsection of firms present in the
AMADEUS dataset for Germany, the number of small firms is slightly under-represented
while the number of medium firms is slightly over-represented with respect to the
distribution of all the surveyed firms in EFIGE. Hence, we should be cautious in the
interpretation of results for Germany and make sure is that they are not biased by this
fact.
3.3 limitations of the traditional competitiveness indicators
Porter (1990) defines the competitiveness of a nation as the productivity with which a
nation utilizes its human, capital and natural resources. The OECD considers the ability
of a country to sell its products in the international markets while Krugman (1994) refers
to competitiveness as a poetic way of speaking about productivity, and warns about the
danger of obsessing about the competitiveness of a country. Most of these definitions of
competitiveness allude to the relative position of a country in international trade. This
position, in principle, depends on price and cost factors because if they have a negative
evolution in relation with those from others economies, the ability to sell products at
home and abroad is damaged. This argument, combined with the easy availability of
data, makes price-cost competitiveness indicators especially attractive for the analysis of
a country’s economic situation. This is why the classical macroeconomic textbooks relate
the competitiveness of nations to the comparison of their relative prices.
83
understanding competitiveness
Currently the price-cost indicator of reference to measure competitiveness in the
European Union is the unit labor cost (ULC), which measures the labor cost by unit
of product and is calculated as the ratio of total labor costs to real output.4 A rise in
an economy’s ULC represents an increased reward for labor’s contribution to output.
However, a rise in labor costs higher than the rise in labor productivity may be a threat
to an economy’s cost competitiveness, if other costs are not adjusted in compensation.
A simple comparison of the evolution of prices and costs between two countries may
not be informative enough to determine the competitiveness of a country, and therefore,
the ULC may be a measure of competitiveness with a very limited prediction power. If
an increase in the ULC index indicates a loss in competitiveness of the country, then we
should see a decrease in a country’s export shares whenever aggregate ULC goes up.
Figure 3.2 shows the so called Spanish competitiveness paradox, an example that a loss in
competitiveness does not imply necessarily a loss in the world’s export shares. Figure 3.2a
shows the evolution of the ULC for Spain and the main developed economies, while in
Figure 3.2b shows the evolution of these countries worlds’ export share during the 2000’s.
The Spanish ULC has grown faster than in the main developed countries, but on the
other hand, its export shares have decreased less than those of other countries, the only
exception being Germany.
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ciency of the imports of the country in question. Some authors (e.g. Krugman (1994)) criticise 
the emphasis on international market shares as competitiveness indicators, insofar as they 
give an overly mercantilist view and cannot say anything about the competitiveness of the na-
tion as a whole, but only of its exports.
One option followed in the literature consists in modifying the aggregated sectoral price/
cost measures so that they better capture non-price elements of competitiveness. A prom-
ising example of this approach, albeit still incapable of capturing all the relevant factors, is 
the one that appears in Bennett et al. (2009). These authors argue that non-price elements 
of competitiveness should be reflected in the elasticity of substitution of each product. Ac-
cordingly, they construct real exchange rates which allow such elasticity to differ from prod-
uct to product.
Finally, it should also be pointed out that there are a number of indicators that attempt to 
measure the institutional characteristics of each country that may influence competitiveness. 
This is the case, for example, of the Davos World Economic Forum’s Global Competitive-
ness Report and of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report. In general, these indicators 
are constructed by conducting surveys of various experts of each country on the ease of 
doing business in their country, which are sometimes supplemented with macroeconomic 
indicators. This is a very valuable alternative that provides useful information, since it enables 
areas to be identified in which some countries are clearly lagging. That said, the information 
is subjective, there is sometimes a lack of robust empirical links between the variables ana-
lysed and competitiveness, and it is impossible to draw quantitative conclusions to guide 
economic policy.
Given this wide range of alternative measures of competitiveness and the limitations of each, 
it is not surprising that, for the purposes of the alert mechanism in the context of macroeco-
nomic surveillance and the excessive imbalances procedure recently launched at the Euro-
pean level, it has been decided to monitor the developments in a broad set of competitiveness 
measures. These measures include the current account balance, ULCs, export shares and 
CPI-deflated real exchange rates.
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Figure 3.2: Competitiveness Indicators Vis-á-Vis the Euro Area
4 An assumption implicit in th use of cost based indic tors is that in the short r n the capital is fixed, and
therefore the cost of capital should not differ between similar countries. This assumption can be a limitation
of the cost-competitiveness measures, see Felipe and Kumar (2011) for further details.
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Antràs et al. (2010) show that large Spanish firms experienced both lower ULC growth
and higher export growth than other countries, yet this differential is not reflected in
aggregate price indicators due to aggregation and dispersion bias (Altomonte et al. (2012)).
In the calculation of the ULC all the firms are taken into account while to calculate the
economy’s total exports, only the exporters are taken into account. Firms that export are
usually the largest and most productive of the economy (Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard
and Bradford Jensen (1999)). The different relative weight in the aggregate ULC and in
the economy’s total export, helps therefore to explain the Spanish paradox.
An adequate competitiveness measure should be able to capture the role of firms
and their heterogeneity. Several questions arise then. First, why is heterogeneity so
important? Second, why should a competitiveness measure take into account the
heterogeneity within the firms of an economy? And third, how adequately do traditional
competitiveness measures capture the heterogeneity?
To understand the importance of the heterogeneity between firms, the concept of
productivity is essential since it allows high wages and high capital returns in an economy
(See Porter (2005)). Recent literature in industrial organization and international trade
has provided abundant empirical evidence supporting the idea that the evolution of
macroeconomic aggregates is determined closely by the decisions and characteristics of
the firms in the economy, and in particular by the behavior and productivity of a subgroup
of them: the most productive ones. This is evident in the case of exporting firms. Exporter
firms from a sector or a country are a minority and, in general, they are those that behave
better in terms of productivity, size and innovation. The higher performance is present
before these firms become exporters (see Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard et al. (2011)).
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 illustrate why a competitiveness measure should take into
account this heterogeneity. Table 3.1 shows the export probability (extensive margin) of
a firm in relation to its size for each of the countries in the database of EFIGE, while
Table 3.2 reports the percentage of production that each firm exports (intensive margin).
It is observed that for two similar sized firms from different countries, the probability
of exporting and the export proportion are roughly similar. For example, among firms
with 50 to 249 employees in France and Spain, the probability of exporting is 75.4% and
76.2% respectively, less than a 1 percentage point difference. Furthermore, the difference
in the export intensity of these firms is only 0.3 percentage points. In the aggregate, the
differences between France and Spain in the export probability and the export intensity
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are higher. These differences in the exports aggregated by size, sector or country do
not come from differences in two similar firms from different countries, they are due
to differences in the allocation of resources between the sectors of the economy and
differences in the firm size distribution within sectors.
Employees Austria France Germany Hungary Italy Spain UK
10− 19 69.8 44.7 45.7 58.0 65.4 51.2 54.9
20− 49 63.8 59.1 65.4 64.7 73.3 63.5 62.8
50− 249 88.6 75.4 78.2 79.3 86.6 76.2 76.8
Over 249 90.8 87.6 84.0 97.4 92.6 88.0 90.7
Aggregate 72.6 57.9 63.4 67.3 72.2 61.1 61.0
Table 3.1: Extensive margin of exports (%), by country and company size.
Employees Austria France Germany Hungary Italy Spain UK
10− 19 26.2 23.0 25.9 30.2 30.4 21.4 26.2
20− 49 33.3 27.0 28.1 43.6 34.2 24.5 27.8
50− 249 55.9 33.0 33.9 53.2 42.2 33.3 33.2
Over 249 64.7 41.2 37.8 66.6 52.6 40.6 34.2
Aggregate 40.4 28.5 30.0 44.8 34.6 25.9 29.1
Table 3.2: Intensive margin of exports (%), by country and company size.
Barba-Navaretti et al. (2011) estimate that if Spain had the industrial structure and firm
size distribution of Germany, the exports of Spain would increase 25%. The differences in
the aggregates were due to differences in the allocation of resources between the sectors
of the economy and differences in the firm size distribution of the firms within sectors.
That is, within a sector there can be as much firm heterogeneity as there can be between
firms in different sectors.
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To address how adequately traditional competitiveness measures capture firm
heterogeneity, in the next section we study whether the firm level ULC evolution drives
the aggregate ULC evolution or whether it is driven by other factors.
3.4 ulc decomposition
In this section we analyze how adequately the evolution of the Unit Labor Cost captures
the firm heterogeneity present in a country. We decompose the evolution of the ULCs of
four European countries given the firm-level information in EFIGE. The exercise analyzes
if the aggregate evolution of the ULC between years 2002 and 2007 captures adequately
the evolution of the same variable for the individual firms.5
For that purpose, we calculate at firm level a weighted change of the ULC as:
ULCt+1 −ULCt =
∑
i∈It+1
msi,t+1ulci,t+1 −
∑
i∈It
msi,tulci,t
where ulci,t is the ULC of a given firm i at time t and msi,t is its market share at that
time. The components of the weighted average are decomposed as follows, according to
a Laspeyres decomposition.6
ULCt+1 −ULCt =
∑
i∈It+1
msi,t+1ulci,t+1 −
∑
i∈It
msi,tulci,t
=
∑
i∈I
msi,t (ulci,t+1 − ulci,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within
+
∑
i∈I
ulci,t (msi,t+1 −msi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reallocation
+
∑
i∈I
(msi,t+1 −msi,t) (ulci,t+1 − ulci,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interaction
+
∑
i∈It+1\I
mst+1ulct+1 −
∑
i∈It\I
msi,tulci,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry−Exit
.
5 Unfortunately, the bad coverage of Amadeus for Germany does not let us use the whole sample from 2001
to 2009.
6 Note that the latter decomposition is also discussed by Boone et al. (2007), as the starting point of the indicator
of competition, and by (Altomonte et al., 2010).
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The first element, the within component, is the change attributable to the evolution of
the firms’ ULC given their market share: a positive sign would imply a relevant loss in
competitiveness at the firm level. The second element, the reallocation component, accounts
for the redistribution of market shares among the firms, holding the ULC constant: a
negative sign implies a reallocation of market shares towards firms with initial lower ULC.
The third element, the interaction component, gives information about the underlying
dynamics: a negative sign would show that ULCs and market shares are moving in
different directions, either because their activity is expanding thanks to a reduction in
ULC or because the importance of their sector is decreasing after an increase in the ULC.
The fourth element, the entry and exit component is indicative of the market dynamics
that follow the removal of barriers fostering entry, and the exogenous shocks that can
oblige some firms to exit. As we already discussed in Section 3.2, the EFIGE survey is
not designed to keep track of entry and exit of firms, therefore this element is simply a
residual of the calculation, and will be ignored in the discussion.
If the aggregate ULC was a measure that captured adequately the heterogeneity existent
at the firm level ULC, its evolution should be driven by the evolution of the firm level ULC.
Then we should observe the within component to be the most relevant in the explanation
of the aggregate ULC evolution.
Table 3.3 shows the result of the of the decomposition of the change in aggregate ULC in
manufacturing between years 2002 and 2007 annualized. First, on average, for the period
considered, the real ULCs have decreased in all countries indicating an improvement in
the cost competitiveness of the countries — which is supported as well by results using
the EU-KLEMS database. Second, the weight of the change in competitiveness within
firms is small, particularly in Italy and Spain, where it is 0.17% and −0.21% respectively.
Third, the interaction effect has the desired sign, negative. Unfortunately we can not infer
if is due to to the activity of firms expanding thanks to a reduction in ULC or because
the importance of their sector is decreasing after an increase in the ULC. Fourth, the
reallocation of resources is the component that explains most of the evolution of the ULC
for all the countries in the sample. The relative intensity differs between countries: the
largest reallocation of resources occurs in Germany, followed by France, then Italy and
Spain. Not only is the the reallocation of resources in France and Germany larger, but
it is also the most important factor in the explanation of the evolution of the aggregate
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ULC. In Italy and Spain, the interaction effect has a similar weight as the reallocation of
resources effect in the explanation of the evolution of the aggregate ULC.
Total Within Reallocation Interaction Entry-Exit
France −2.62 −1.19 −1.87 −0.61 1.06
Germany −3.25 −1.55 −2.69 −0.43 1.42
Italy −1.38 0.17 −1.35 −1.42 1.22
Spain −2.06 −0.21 −1.19 −1.27 0.61
Table 3.3: Changes in the ULCs of each country (annualized rate), 2002-2007
Table 3.4 shows the relative accumulated evolution of the ULC of each country with
respect to the evolution of Germany for the period 2002 to 2007. A positive number
indicates the possible gain associated with each effect if these countries had had the
evolution of Germany. The change in competitiveness within firms was particularly small
in Italy and Spain, which implies losses of competitiveness with respect to Germany of
8.75% in Italy and 7% in Spain. More importantly, the smaller reallocation of resources
with respect to Germany between 2002 and 2007 implies losses of competitiveness around
4.3% in France, 6.4% in Italy and 8% in Spain.
Total Within Reallocation Interaction
France 5.22 1.86 4.27 −0.91
Italy 10.37 8.75 6.39 −4.77
Spain 10.82 7.00 7.95 −4.14
Table 3.4: Changes in the ULCs of each country relative to Germany, 2002-2007
Even though the exercise has limitations since we are only looking at manufacturing
firms, recent empirical research with sectoral data shows that the reallocation of resources
within the sector is key to understand the evolution of aggregate ULC. Given the
importance of the reallocation of resources to explain the evolution of the ULC, in the
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next section we will focus in understanding what would be the productivity gains in each
of these countries if there were no misallocation, that is, if all the resources were allocated
efficiently.
3.5 resources’ misallocation : source of country differences in
productivity
The ability to reallocate resources within the firms of the economy has a very significant
role in the explanation of the evolution of the aggregate ULC. In this section we apply the
methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to explain the impact of an efficient allocation
of resources in the productivity and output of France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
3.5.1 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) Methodology
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) propose an empirical framework to investigate if large
differences in output per worker across countries (or sectors) are due to the fact that
there is “misallocation” across plants, firms and sectors. The empirical framework
proposed, while based on specific parametric assumptions on preferences and production
technology, enables a clean representation of the potential impact of “misallocation” on
sectoral or aggregate productivity.
Consider an economy consisting of S sectors and aggregate output is defined as:
Y =
S∏
s=1
Yθss where
S∑
s=1
θs = 1. (3.1)
Let P =
∏S
s=1
(
Ps
θs
)θs
represent the price of the final food, where Ps refers to the price of
industry output Ys. Then, cost minimization implies
PsYs = θsPY. (3.2)
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Industry output Ys is itself a C.E.S. aggregate of Ms differentiated products:
Ys =
(
Ms∑
i=1
Y
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
,
and each firm in sector s has a Cobb-Douglas production function that depends on firm
TFP, capital and labor7:
Ysi = AsiK
αs
si L
1−αs
si .
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) assume that there are firm specific distortions affecting total
production and capital which are modelled as taxes. They denote distortions that increase
the marginal products of capital and labor by the same proportion as an output distortion
τY , and denote distortions that raise the marginal product of capital relative to labor as the
capital distortion τK. As a result of these distortions, firms produce different amounts than
what would be dictated by their productivity and also may have different capital-labor
ratios.8
Combining the aggregate demand for capital and labor in a sector, the expression for
the price of aggregate industry output and Equation 3.2, aggregate output can then be
expressed as a function of Ks, Ls, and industry TFP:
Y =
S∏
s=1
(
TFPs ·Kαss · L1−αss
)θs . (3.3)
To determine the formula for industry productivity TFPs it has to be noted that when
industry deflators are used, differences in plant specific prices show up in the customary
measure of plant TFP. Foster et al. (2008) stress the distinction between “physical
productivity” (TFPQ) and “revenue productivity” (TFPR).
TFPQsi
4
= Asi =
Ysi
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
,
TFPRsi
4
= PsiAsi =
PsiYsi
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
.
7 Note that capital and labor shares may differ across industries but not across firms within an industry.
8 See the Appendix for a full derivation of the firm’s maximization problem.
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If there are no firm specific distortions and all firms within a sector have the same
markup (assumed by this framework but obviously not true in general), TFPR will be
equalized across firms. In the absence of distortions, more labor and capital should be
allocated to plants with higher TFPQ to the point where their higher output results
in a lower price and the exact same TFPR as smaller plants. TFPR is proportional to a
geometric average of the plant’s marginal revenue products of labor and capital:
TFPRsi ∝ (1+ τKsi)
αs
1− τYsi
. (3.4)
High plant TFPR is a sign that the plant faces barriers that raise the plant’s marginal
products of labor and capital, rendering the plant smaller than optimal. In general,
variation of TFPR within a sector will be a measure of misallocation.
Then, the relevant measure of sectoral TFP can be written as:9
TFPs =
(
Ms∑
i=1
(
TFPQsi · TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1) 1σ−1
, (3.5)
where TFPRs is the geometric average of the average marginal revenue product of capital
and labor in sector s. Intuitively, the extent of misallocation is worse when there is greater
dispersion of marginal products.
To see this more clearly, consider a special case where TFPQsi and TFPRsi are jointly
lognormally distributed, then the expression in Equation 3.5 implies:
logTFPs =
1
σ− 1
log
(
Ms∑
i=1
Aσ−1si
)
−
σ
2
var(logTFPRsi),
so that the negative effect of distortions can be summarized by the variance of log TFPR.
3.5.2 Gains of an Efficient Allocation of Resources in Europe
In order to determine the gains from an efficient allocation of resources, we calculate
“efficient” output in each country so we can compare it with actual output levels. If there
9 See the Appendix C for the full derivation of Equation 3.5.
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are no firm specific distortions, TFPR will be equalized across firms within a sector. Then,
industry TFP would be As =
(∑Ms
i=1A
σ−1
si
) 1
σ−1
. For each industry, we calculate the ratio
of actual TFP (Equation 3.5) to this efficient level of TFP, and then aggregate this ratio
across sectors using the Cobb-Douglas aggregator (Equation 3.1):
Y
Yefficient
=
S∏
s=1
[
Ms∑
i=1
(
Asi
As
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1] θsσ−1
(3.6)
To calculate the effects of resource misallocation, we need to estimate key parameters
(industry output shares, industry capital shares, and the firm-specific distortions) from
the data.
The data for France, Germany, Italy and Spain are drawn from the joint
EFIGE-Amadeus dataset. The information we use are the plant’s industry (four-digit
level), age (based on reported birth year), wage payments, value-added, export revenues,
and capital stock. For labor input we use the plant’s wage bill10 rather than its
employment to measure Lsi. As a later robustness check, we measure Lsi as employment.
We define capital stock as the book value of fixed capital net of depreciation.
We set the rental price of capital (excluding distortions) to R = 0.10, we have in
mind a 5% real interest rate and a 5% depreciation rate.11 We set the elasticity of
substitution between plant value added to σ = 3, which ranges within the estimates
of the substitutability of competing manufactures in the trade and industrial organization
literature (Broda and Weinstein (2006)). Later, we entertain the higher value of 5 and a
lower value of 2 for σ as a robustness check. We set the elasticity of output with respect to
capital in each industry (αs) to be 1 minus the labor share in the corresponding industry
in Germany in 2008. We adopt the German shares as the benchmark.
On the basis of the other parameters and the plant data, we infer the distortions and
productivity for each plant in each country-year as follows:
1+ τKsi =
αs
1−αs
wLsi
RKsi
(3.7)
10 The Amadeus data only report wage payments; the information on non-wage compensation is not reported.
11 The actual cost of capital faced by plant i in industry s is denoted (1 + τKsi)R, so it differs from 10% if
τKsi > 0. Because our hypothetical reforms collapse τKsi to its average in each industry, if R is set incorrectly,
it will affect the average capital distortion but not the experiment itself.
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1− τYsi =
σ
σ− 1
wLsi
(1−αs)PsiYsi
(3.8)
Asi =
(PsiYsi)
σ
σ−1
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
(3.9)
Before calculating the gains from our hypothetical liberalization, we trim the 1% tails
of log(TFPRsi/TFPRs) and log(Asi/As) across industries to make the results robust to
outliers. We then recalculate wLs, Ks, PsYs, TFPRs and As.
Table 3.5 provides percent TFP gains in each country from fully equalizing TFPR across
plants in each industry for the years 2002 to 2008, where the entries are 100(Yefficient/Y−
1). As we discussed in Section 3.2, a major shortcoming of the unification of the EFIGE
and AMADEUS dataset is that the coverage of Amadeus for the firms surveyed is not
100%. In this exercise, for the years 2002 to 2008, for France, Italy and Spain there is
a coverage of 80% to 90% of the firms, whereas for Germany it is considerably lower.
Particularly, for the years 2002 and 2003 there is information for less that 50% of the firms,
and for the years 2004 to 2008 it ranges between 50% and 70%. Hence, in Table 3.5 we do
not report hypothetical gains from an efficient allocation of resources for Germany for the
years 2002 and 2003, and the variation in these gains is calculated for the years 2008-2004
instead of 2008-2002.
Removing all barriers, by this calculation, would boost aggregate manufacturing TFP
in 2008 by 22.7% in France, 27.9% in Germany, 43.5% in Italy and 28.2% in Spain. More
interestingly, we observe that between the years 2002 to 2008, the gains from efficient
allocation decrease in Germany (−8.50%), increase in Italy and Spain (6.93% and 6.97%),
and are constant in France (−0.82%). This reveals that within this period, in Italy and
Spain the “misallocation” of resources within the sector has increased while in France
it remains constant and in Germany it decreases. An increase in the “misallocation” of
resources in Italy and Spain, reveals an increase in the distortions or barriers to production
present in these countries which is consistent with their smaller ability to reallocate
market shares towards firms with initially smaller ULC as reported in Table 3.3. At the
same time, the decrease in the “misallocation” of resources in Germany is also reflected by
the greater ability of reallocating market shares to firms initially lower ULC. The results
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of the decomposition in the evolution of ULC and an hypothetical efficient allocation of
resources are complementary to each other.
Year France Germany Italy Spain
2002 23.55 36.41 21.23
2003 19.29 30.46 21.68
2004 22.07 36.41 32.75 23.30
2005 22.43 31.90 30.46 24.66
2006 23.88 32.30 32.97 24.70
2007 20.95 33.25 34.54 28.71
2008 22.74 27.92 43.34 28.20
∆2008−2002 −0.82 −8.50 6.93 6.97
Table 3.5: TFP Gains from Equalizing TFPR within Industries
Figure 3.3 plots the “efficient” versus actual size distribution of plants in year 2008,
where size is measured as plant value added. In all the countries except Germany, the
hypothetical efficient distribution is more dispersed than the actual one. In particular, in
all countries, there should be fewer mid-sized plants and more small and large plants. The
popular belief is that there are less large firms then there should be due to distortions in
the economy, but not that there are less small firms than there should be like the flattening
of these distributions is predicting. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) find similar predictions
for the analysis they do of China, India and the United States, which suggest that the
shape of the efficient plant size distribution is robust across countries. In Germany, the
efficient distribution is more dispersed as well, but we observe a shift to the right in the
distribution rather than a flattening like it happens in the other countries. The reason
behind the different behavior in Germany lies probably in the bias in the size distribution
of the German firms present in the AMADEUS dataset that we have explained in Section
3.2. The small firms in terms of employment are very under-represented in the subsection
of German firms present in the AMADEUS side of the data (see Figure 3.1), hence the
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explanation to why there is no flattening in the efficient distribution and the exercise
predicts that a large group of the medium sized firms in terms of output should decrease
their size.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Plant Size
Table 3.6 shows how the size of initially big vs. small plants would change if TFPR
were equalized in each country. The entries are unweighted shares of plants. The rows
are actual plant size quartiles, and the columns are bins of efficient plant size relative to
actual size: 0% − 50% — the plant should shrink by a half or more, 50% − 100% — the
plant should shrink by less than half, 100%− 200% — the plant should increase but not
double in size, > 200% — the plant should at least double in size.
In all countries, firms with initial smaller size should increase. Particularly for Italy
and Spain, not only there is a large number of firms that should increase their size but
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also that should at least double in size. In all countries, firms with initial size in the 2nd
quartile should either shrink by half or at least double in size. This indicates that there
is a large number of small medium sized firms that should not be there. In all countries,
firms with initial size in the 3rd quartile should shrink. This is particularly relevant for
Germany. Finally, firms with initial size in the top quartile should not shrink as much and
actually should increase their size, but not double it. That is, large firms should be larger
in all countries, whereas medium productivity firms should shrink and there are some
small firms that should increase their size given their real productivities.
[0%− 50%] [50%− 100%] [100%− 200%] > 200%
France
1st quartile 3.84 2.25 8.70 10.29
2nd quartile 11.97 0.47 0.47 12.07
3rd quartile 8.04 14.87 1.50 0.56
Top quartile 1.22 7.39 14.31 2.06
Germany
1st quartile 1.75 2.62 10.92 10.04
2nd quartile 10.48 2.62 0.0 12.23
3rd quartile 10.48 14.41 0.0 0.0
Top quartile 2.18 5.68 14.41 2.62
Italy
1st quartile 2.44 0.57 5.61 16.41
2nd quartile 14.13 3.49 0.16 7.23
3rd quartile 7.31 13.81 3.57 0.32
Top quartile 1.14 7.15 15.68 0.97
Spain
1st quartile 2.91 0.97 9.06 12.08
2nd quartile 12.84 0.65 0.76 10.79
3rd quartile 8.20 16.07 0.54 0.22
Top quartile 1.08 7.34 14.67 1.83
Table 3.6: Actual size vs. Efficient size (Percent of Plants)
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We now provide a number of robustness checks to our baseline Table 3.5 calculations of
hypothetical efficiency gains. We have measured plant labor input using its wage bill. The
logic is that wages per worker adjust for plant differences in hours worked per worker
and worker skills. However, wages could also reflect rent sharing between the plant and
its workers. If so, we might be interpreting differences in TFPR across plants because
the most profitable plants have to pay higher wages. We therefore recalculate the gains
from equalizing TFPR in France, Germany, Italy and Spain using simply employment as
our measure of plant labor input. The gains from an efficient allocation remain almost
unchanged for all countries with the exception of Germany — 21.18% for France, 35.44%
for Germany, 42.56% for Italy and 27.58% for Spain in 2008. The intuition behind the
smaller gains for Germany when we use the wage bill rather than the employees is that
wage differences may be limiting the TFPR differences.
We have assumed an elasticity of substitution within industries (σ) of 3. However the
literature on business cycles puts it at 2 while the literature more close to international
trade puts it at 5. Our estimates are sensitive to this parameter, with an increase between
10% and 20% in the gains from efficient allocation if σ = 5, and a decrease of 5% to 10% if
σ = 2. The intuition behind these results, is that when the elasticity of substitution within
industries is larger, then TFPR gaps are closed more slowly in response to reallocation of
inputs from low to high TFPR plants, enabling bigger gains from equalizing TFPR gains.
Given the dispersion in the size of the firms within the sectors and between countries,12
a last valid concern might be that the trimming of the productivity measures is large.
Firms with extreme productivity values have a high relative weight (following a trend
more similar to a Pareto distribution than a Normal distribution), which means that the
behaviour of the sector aggregates are strongly influenced by the behaviour of the largest
firms (di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), Altomonte et al. (2010) and Altomonte et al.
(2011)). Hence, less trimming (or no trimming at all) in the right tail of the distribution,
implies a higher dispersion in the data observed, and we expect larger gains from an
hypothetical efficient allocation of resources. To analyze the robustness of the calculations
to the dispersion in firm size, we trim only 0.5% of the right tail of log(TFPRsi/TFPRs)
before calculating the hypothetical gains. While the results prove to be sensitive to this
trimming, and as expected there is an increase in the gains from an efficient allocation, this
12 In Italy and Spain there are less large firms than in Germany and France. See Crespo (2012) and Rubini et al.
(2012).
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increase is similar across countries (around 5%) — 26.86% in France, 33.97% in Germany,
49.33% in Italy and 35.46% in Spain. Between 2002 and 2008, the predicted gains from an
efficient allocation decrease in 3.64% in France, decrease in 9.20% in Germany, increase in
9.07% in Italy and increase in 10.56%. While the variations are slightly larger, the ranking
is unchanged and therefore the conclusions of our exercise are consistent.
3.6 conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the ability of the change in the aggregate unit labor cost
to capture the change in the competitiveness of a country.
Using firm level data, we calculate a weighted change of the aggregate unit labor costs
between 2002 and 2007 for four European countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
The components of the weighted average are then decomposed according to a Laspeyres
decomposition into three main elements: the first captures changes in firm-level unit labor
costs, keeping the initial domestic market shares of firms constant; the second quantifies
the reallocation of market shares within the domestic economy, keeping the initial unit
labor costs constant; and the third measures the interaction between the first two. The
results reveal that the evolution of the firm-level unit labor cost does not explain the
evolution of the aggregate unit labor costs, rather it is the resource reallocation that drives
the evolution of the aggregate unit labor costs.
Motivated by the significant role of the reallocation of resources to explain the evolution
of the aggregate ULC, we apply the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to analyze
the extent to which aggregate productivity differences between these four European
countries relate to inefficient resource reallocation. As a result of distortions that affect
production, firms produce different amounts than what would be dictated by their
productivity. An efficient allocation of resources would boost aggregate manufacturing
TFP in 2008 by 22.7% in France, 27.9% in Germany, 43.5% in Italy and 28.2% in Spain.
The empirical analysis of the unit labor costs as a competitiveness measure reveals the
need to use microeconomic data to understand the driving factors behind the evolution of
macroeconomic aggregates. And the decomposition of the aggregate indicator shows that
there are relevant differences among countries which in the aggregate cannot be observed
due to the noisiness of the measure.
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A P P E N D I X A : P R O O F S O F C H A P T E R 1
a.1 closed economy
productivity distribution and weighted averages
Let us denote by ηD (ϕ) and ηDI (ϕ) respectively, the productivity distribution of
domestic producers and active innovators.
ηD (ϕ) =
g(ϕ)
G(ϕDI)−G(ϕD)
, ϕI > ϕ > ϕD;
0 , otherwise;
ηDI (ϕ) =
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕDI)
, ϕ > ϕDI;
0 , otherwise;
The distributions ηD (ϕ) and ηDI (ϕ) are not affected by the simultaneous entry and
exit since the successful entrants and failing incumbents draw their productivity level
from the common distribution µ (ϕ).
Let ϕ˜ =
[∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ (ϕ)dϕ
] 1
(σ−1) which represents the average
productivity of all the firms in the economy prior to innovation and ϕ˜I =[∫∞
ϕDI
(
ϕσ−1
) (α+1)
α ηDI (ϕ)dϕ
] α
(α+1)
1
(σ−1)
which represents the average productivity
of the innovators after innovation.
aggregate variables
Denote by mI and m respectively the mass of active innovators and non-innovator
producers, where
mI =
1−G (ϕDI)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
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m =
G (ϕDI) −G (ϕD)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
with M being the mass of incumbent firms in the economy.
Then, it can be shown that the aggregates will take the following expressions
− Aggregate Price Index
P1−σ =M [pD (ϕ˜)]
1−σ +mIz (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α [
pD
(
ϕ˜I
(α+1α )
)]1−σ
.
Notice that the first term coincides exactly with the aggregate price of the Melitz
2003 economy, therefore we can distinguish exactly the effect that having an
innovation choice has on the aggregates of the economy, since this term will be
distinguished in every one of the aggregates.
− Aggregate Production
Qρ =M [qD (ϕ˜)]
ρ +mIz (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α [
qD
(
ϕ˜I
(α+1α )
)]ρ
.
− Aggregate Revenue
R =M · rD (ϕ˜) +mIz (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α
rD
(
ϕ˜I
(α+1α )
)
.
− Aggregate Profits
Π =M
rD (ϕ˜)
σ
−MfD −mIfI +mIα
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
(
rD (ϕ˜I)
σ
)(α+1α )
. (A.1)
a.1.1 Closed Economy Equilibrium
proof of Proposition 1
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Equation 1.4 and Equation 1.5 along with the Free Entry condition (Equation 1.7)
uniquely determine the equilibrium and the productivity cutoffs. Rearrange the FE
condition conveniently for the characterizing of the equilibrium as a function of ϕ∗D.
δfE = [1−G (ϕ
∗
D)]
δfE = fDk1 (ϕ
∗
D) +
(mI
M
)
α
(
fD
α+ 1
)α+1
α
k2 (ϕ
∗
D) −
(mI
M
)
fI. (A.2)
where k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜(ϕ∗D)
ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
and k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜I(ϕ∗D)
ϕ∗D
)(σ−1)]α+1α
.
Proof. We are going to prove that the RHS of Equation A.2 is decreasing in ϕ∗D on the
domain
(
ϕ∗D,∞), so that ϕ∗D is uniquely determine by the intersection of the latter curve
with the flat line δfE in the
(
ϕ∗D,∞) space. The last term on Equation A.2 is constant,
therefore we only need to show that the other two terms are decreasing.
Remember that k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜(ϕ∗D)
ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
, then its derivative with respect to ϕ∗D is
k′1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g
(
ϕ∗D
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗D
)k1 (ϕ∗D) − (σ− 1) [k1 (ϕ∗D)+ 1]ϕ∗D .
Similarly, k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
ϕ˜I(ϕ∗D)
ϕ∗D
](σ−1)b
, and its derivative with respect to ϕ∗D is
k′2 (ϕ
∗
D) = Λ
1
σ−1
g
(
ϕ∗I
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗I
) [k2 (ϕ∗D) −Λα+1α ]−(α+ 1α
)
(σ− 1)
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
ϕ∗D
,
where ∂ϕ
∗
DI
∂ϕ∗D
=
[(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
fD
] 1
σ−1
= Λ
1
σ−1 .
Define j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗D
)]
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
, and j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗DI
)]
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
which
are non-negative.
Then the derivative and elasticity of each of the expressions are respectively
j′1 (ϕ
∗
D) = −
(σ− 1)
[
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
+ 1
]
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗D)] < 0,
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j′1
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j1
(
ϕ∗D
) = −(σ− 1)[1+ 1
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −(σ− 1) ,
and
j′2 (ϕ
∗
D) = −g (ϕ
∗
DI)Λ
1
σ−1
Λ
α+1
α − θ (α+ 1) (σ− 1)
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗DI)] < 0,
j′2
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j2
(
ϕ∗D
) = − g (ϕ∗DI)[
1−G
(
ϕ∗DI
)]Λ 1σ−1Λα+1α
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) ϕ∗D −(α+ 1α
)
(σ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ− 1) .
Therefore, j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
and j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to infinite.
Furthermore, it must be that lim
ϕ∗D→0
j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ and
lim
ϕ∗D→0
j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞. Hence, j1 (ϕ∗D) and j2 (ϕ∗D) decrease from∞ to zero on the parameter space (0,∞) ,and thus the RHS of Equation A.2 is drecreasing
on the parameter space.
comparison of the entry cutoff with melitz’s (2003)
Let’s denote the cutoff productivity level in a closed economy found in Melitz (2003)
by ϕ∗M, then we have that ϕ
∗
D > ϕ
∗
M.
Proof. Using the ZPC and the labor market clearing condition, which are common to both
models:(
ϕ∗D
ϕ∗M
)σ−1
=
P1−σ
P1−σM
,
where P1−σ = M [pD (ϕ˜)]
1−σ +mI
(
fI
α
) 1
α+1
(
1
ϕσ−1I
) 1
α
[
pD
(
ϕ˜I
α+1
α
)]1−σ
and P1−σM =
M [pD (ϕ˜)]
1−σ.
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Let ϕ∗M > ϕ∗D, then P1−σM > P1−σ, which implies that∫∞
ϕ∗M
[pD (ϕ)]
1−σ µ (ϕ)dϕ−
∫∞
ϕ∗D
[pD (ϕ)]
1−σ µ (ϕ)dϕ >
> mI
M
(
fI
α
) 1
α+1
(
1
ϕσ−1I
) 1
α [
pD
(
ϕ˜I
α+1
α
)]1−σ
,
which is impossible since the RHS is positive and the LHS is negative.
Therefore, it must be that ϕ∗D > ϕ
∗
M.
The ability of some firms to invest in a cost reducing technology enables them to have
more market shares than they would without the presence of innovation, logically, those
market shares are "stolen" from the less productive firms of the economy, i.e. to enter in
the market in this economy a firm must be more productive than in an economy without
technology. Hence we have firms that are more efficient but less varieties on the economy.
a.2 open economy
a.2.1 Low Cost Innovation Economy
productivity distribution and weighted averages
Let us denote by µD (ϕ), µDI (ϕ) and µXI (ϕ) respectively, the productivity distribution
of domestic producers, active innovators and active innovators and exporters prior to
innovation.
µD (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
G(ϕDI)−G(ϕD)
, ϕDI > ϕ > ϕD;
0 , otherwise;
µDI (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
G(ϕXI)−G(ϕDI)
, ϕXI > ϕ > ϕDI;
0 , otherwise;
µXI (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕXI)
, ϕ > ϕXI;
0 , otherwise;
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The distributions µD (ϕ), µDI (ϕ) and µXI (ϕ) are not affected by the simultaneous
entry and exit since the successful entrants and failing incumbents draw their productivity
level from the common distribution µ (ϕ) .
Let ϕ˜ =
[∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ (ϕ)dϕ
] 1
(σ−1) and ϕ˜X =
[∫∞
ϕXI
ϕσ−1µXI (ϕ)dϕ
] 1
(σ−1) denote the
average productivity levels of, respectively, all firms and exporting firms only prior to
innovation. Then the weighted productivity average that reflects the combined market
share of all firms can be defined as
ϕ˜t =
{
1
Mt
[
Mϕ˜σ−1 +nMX
(
τ−1ϕ˜X
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
.
And let ϕ˜DI =
[∫∞
ϕDI
(
ϕσ−1
) (α+1)
α µDI (ϕ)dϕ
] α
(α+1)
1
(σ−1)
and ϕ˜XI represent the average
productivity the domestic innovators and exporter innovators get from innovation. Then
the weighted productivity average that reflects the combined market share of innovation
can be defined as
ϕ˜It =
{
1
MIt
[
MIϕ˜
(σ−1)(α+1α )
DI +mXI
((
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
− 1
)
ϕ˜
(σ−1)(α+1α )
XI
]}( αα+1 )( 1σ−1 )
.
aggregate variables
Denote by mXI,mDI and mD respectively the mass of active innovators and exporters,
active innovators but non-exporters and non-innovators and non-exporters present in the
economy,
mXI =
1−G (ϕXI)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
mDI =
G (ϕXI) −G (ϕDI)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
mD =
G (ϕDI) −G (ϕD)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
with M being the mass of incumbent firms in the economy, MI = mDI +mXI the
number of firms that perform innovation activities and MX = mXI the number of firms
performing exporting activities. The total number of varieties sold in the economy (by
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symmetry) will be Mt = M + nMX, and the total number of varieties coming from
innovators will be MIt =MI +nMX.
It can be shown that the aggregates will take the following expressions
− Aggregate Price Index
P1−σ =Mt [pD (ϕ˜t)]
1−σ +MItzD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α [
pD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)]1−σ
.
− Aggregate Production
Qρ =Mt [qD (ϕ˜t)]
ρ +MItzD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α [
qD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)]ρ
.
− Aggregate Revenue
R =MtrD (ϕ˜t) +M
I
tzD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α
rD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)
.
− Aggregate Profits
Π = Mt
rD (ϕ˜t)
σ
−MfD −nMXfX −MIfI +MIα
(
1
α+ 1
· rD (ϕ˜I)
σ
)α+1
α
+mXI
[(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
(
rD (ϕ˜XI)
σ
)α+1
α
. (A.3)
a.2.1.1 Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium
proof of Proposition 2 , part ii
If there are sufficiently high fixed export cost, there exist a single cutoff ϕ∗XI that solves
Equation 1.12
Proof. The proof is divided in three sections
First, I show that the LHS of Equation 1.12 is positive with respect to the productivity
parameter. piXI (ϕXI) − piDI (ϕXI) > 0
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[(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
α
(
1
α+1
)α+1
α
[(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α
+nτ1−σ
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1−nfx> 0;
C1
(
ϕσ−1
)α+1
α +C2ϕ
σ−1 −nfx > 0;
∂LHS
∂ϕ
= C1
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ− 1)ϕ(
α+1
α )(σ−1)−1 +C2 (σ− 1)ϕ
σ−2 > 0.
Secondly, I show that piXI (ϕDI) − piDI (ϕDI) < 0, otherwise the firm would choose to
export and innovate instead of being indifferent between innovating or not while staying
in the domestic market.
piXI (ϕDI) − piDI (ϕDI) < 0,[(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
fI +nτ
1−σ
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) −nfX < 0.
Thus, for fX large enough, that is for
fX >
[(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
fI
n
+ τ1−σ
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
it holds that piXI (ϕDI) − piDI (ϕDI) < 0
Finally, I show that the difference between the profits of the exporting and
non-exporting strategies while innovation goes to infinite as the productivity of the firm
is larger.
If ϕ → ∞,then piXI (zD (ϕ)) − piDI (zD (ϕ)) → ∞, since by definition piXI (zX (ϕ)) >
piXI (zD (ϕ)) then it must be that piXI (zX (ϕ)) − piDI (zD (ϕ))→∞ as ϕ→∞
piXI (zD (ϕ)) − piDI (zD (ϕ)) = nτ
1−σ [1+ z]
(
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1 −nfX
= nτ1−σ
(
1
α+ 1
) 1
α
[(
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α
+nτ1−σ
(
R (Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1 −nfX.
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lim
ϕ→∞ [piXI (zD (ϕ)) − piDI (zD (ϕ))] = limϕ→∞
[
C4
[
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α +C5ϕ
σ−1 −C6
]
= lim
ϕ→∞
[
C4
[
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α
]
+ lim
ϕ→∞
[
C5ϕ
σ−1
]
− lim
ϕ→∞ (C6)→∞.
proof of Proposition 2 , part i
Equation 1.10 to Equation 1.12 along with the Free Entry condition (Equation 1.13)
completely determine the equilibrium and the productivity cutoffs. Rearrange the FE
conveniently for the characterizing of the equilibrium as a function of ϕ∗D
δfE = [1−G (ϕ
∗
D)]pi
δfE = fDj1 (ϕ
∗
D) +nτ
1−σfDj2 (ϕ
∗
X (ϕ
∗
D)) − [1−G (ϕ
∗
XI)]nfX (A.4)
− [1−G (ϕ∗DI)] fI +α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
f
α+1
α
D j3 (ϕ
∗
D)
+α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
fD
α+1
α
[(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
j4 (ϕ
∗
D) .
where j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
,
j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
(
ϕ˜x
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1 [
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
)]
,
j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜DI
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1]α+1α [
1−G
(
ϕ∗DI
)]
,
and j4
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜XI
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1]α+1α [
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
)]
.
Proof.
Assume the parameter restrictions τσ−1fX >
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ
fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) and(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) > fD hold, then the Low Cost Innovation Equilibrium exists and is
unique. I shall proof that the RHS of Equation A.4 is decreasing in ϕ∗D on the domain(
ϕ∗D,∞), so that ϕ∗D is uniquely determined by the intersection of the latter curve with
the flat line δfE in the
(
ϕ∗D,∞) space.
Let k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
, then
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k′1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g
(
ϕ∗D
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗D
)k1 (ϕ∗D) − (σ− 1) [k1 (ϕ∗D)+ 1]ϕ∗D .
Similarly, k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜DI
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1]α+1α , thus
k′3 (ϕ
∗
D) = Λ
1
σ−1
g
(
ϕ∗I
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗I
) [k2 (ϕ∗D) −Λα+1α ]−(α+ 1α
)
(σ− 1)
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
ϕ∗D
,
where ∂ϕ
∗
DI
∂ϕ∗D
=
[(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
fD
] 1
σ−1
= Λ
1
σ−1 .
Define j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗D
)]
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
, and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗DI
)]
k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
which
are non-negative.
Then the derivative and elasticity of j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
are
j′1 (ϕ
∗
D) = −
(σ− 1)
[
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
+ 1
]
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗D)] < 0,
j′1
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j1
(
ϕ∗D
) = −(σ− 1)[1+ 1
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −(σ− 1) ,
and
j′3 (ϕ
∗
D) = −g (ϕ
∗
DI)Λ
1
σ−1
Λ
α+1
α − θ (α+ 1) (σ− 1)
k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗DI)] < 0,
j′3
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j3
(
ϕ∗D
) = − g (ϕ∗DI)[
1−G
(
ϕ∗DI
)]Λ 1σ−1Λα+1α
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) ϕ∗D −(α+ 1α
)
(σ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ− 1)
< −
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ− 1) .
Thus, j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to infinite. Furthermore,
it must be that lim
ϕ∗D→0
j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=∞.and lim
ϕ∗D→0
j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=∞ since
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lim
ϕ∗D→0
k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞. Since j1 (ϕ∗D) and j3 (ϕ∗D), it follows that j2 (ϕ∗D) and j4 (ϕ∗D) do
also monotonically decrease from infinite to zero on the (0,∞) parameter space. Therefore,
the RHS of Equation A.4 is a monotonic decreasing function from infinity to zero on the
space (0,∞) that cuts the FE flat line from above identifying a unique cutoff level ϕ∗D.
a.2.2 Low Cost Trade Economy
productivity distribution and weighted averages
Let us denote by µD (ϕ), µX (ϕ) and µXI (ϕ) respectively, the productivity distribution
of domestic producers, exporters and innovators exporters.
µD (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
G(ϕX)−G(ϕD)
, ϕX > ϕ > ϕD;
0 , otherwise;
µX (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
G(ϕXI)−G(ϕX)
, ϕXI > ϕ > ϕX;
0 , otherwise;
µXI (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕXI)
, ϕ > ϕXI;
0 , otherwise;
The distributions µD (ϕ), µX (ϕ) and µXI (ϕ) are not affected by the simultaneous entry
and exit since the successful entrants and failing incumbents draw their productivity level
from the common distribution µ (ϕ) .
Let ϕ˜ =
[∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ (ϕ)dϕ
] 1
(σ−1) and ϕ˜X =
[∫∞
ϕXI
ϕσ−1µXI (ϕ)dϕ
] 1
(σ−1) denote the
average productivity levels of, respectively, all firms and exporting firms only prior to
innovation. Then the weighted productivity average that reflects the combined market
share of all firms can be defined as
ϕ˜t =
{
1
Mt
[
Mϕ˜σ−1 +nMX
(
τ−1ϕ˜X
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
.
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And let ϕ˜XI =
[∫∞
ϕXI
(
ϕσ−1
) (α+1)
α µXI (ϕ)dϕ
] α
(α+1)
1
(σ−1)
represent the average productivity
the innovators get from innovation.
aggregate variables
Denote by mXI,mX and mD respectively the mass of active innovators and exporters,
only exporters and non-innovators non-exporters present in the economy,
mXI =
1−G (ϕXI)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
mX =
G (ϕXI) −G (ϕX)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
mD =
G (ϕX) −G (ϕD)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
withM being the mass of incumbent firms in the economy,MI = mXI the number of firms
that perform innovation activities and MX = mX +mXI the number of firms performing
exporting activities. The total number of varieties sold in the economy (by symmetry) will
be Mt =M+nMX.
It can be shown that the aggregates will take the following expressions
− Aggregate Price Index
P1−σ = Mt [pD (ϕ˜t)]
1−σ
+ mXI
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α [
pD
(
ϕ˜
(α+1α )
XI
)]1−σ
.
− Aggregate Production
Qρ = Mt [qD (ϕ˜t)]
ρ
+ mXI
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α [
qD
(
ϕ˜
(α+1α )
XI
)]ρ
.
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− Aggregate Revenue
R =MtrD (ϕ˜t) +mXI
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
rD
(
ϕ˜
(α+1α )
XI
)
.
− Aggregate Profits
Π = Mt
rD (ϕ˜t)
σ
−MfD −nMXfX −mXIfI (A.5)
+mXI
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
(
rD (ϕ˜I)
σ
)α+1
α
.
a.2.2.1 Low Cost Trade Economy Equilibrium
proof of Proposition 3
Equation 1.14 to Equation 1.16 along with the Free Entry condition (Equation 1.17)
completely determine the equilibrium and the productivity cutoffs. Rearrange the FE
conveniently for the characterizing of the equilibrium as a function of ϕ∗D
δfE = [1−G (ϕ
∗
D)]pi
δfE = fDl1 (ϕ
∗
D) +nfXl2 (ϕ
∗
X (ϕ
∗
D)) (A.6)
+α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α [
fD
(
1+ τ1−σ
)](α+1α )
l3 (ϕ
∗
D) − [1−G (ϕ
∗
XI)] fI.
where j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
,
j2
(
ϕ∗X
(
ϕ∗D
))
=
[(
ϕ˜
(
ϕ∗X
)
/ϕ∗X
)σ−1
− 1
] [
1−G
(
ϕ∗X
)]
,
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜XI
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1](α+1α ) [
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
)]
.
Proof.
Assume the parameter restriction
(
fI
α
) αα+1
(α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
> τσ−1fX > fD holds, then the Low Cost
Trade Equilibrium exists and is unique. I shall proof that the RHS of Equation A.6 is
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decreasing in ϕ∗D on the domain
(
ϕ∗D,∞), so that ϕ∗D is uniquely determined by the
intersection of the latter curve with the flat line δfE in the
(
ϕ∗D,∞) space.
Let k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
, then
k′1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g
(
ϕ∗D
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗D
)k1 (ϕ∗D) − (σ− 1) [k1 (ϕ∗D)+ 1]ϕ∗D .
Similarly, k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜DI
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1]α+1α , thus
k′3 (ϕ
∗
D) = Λ
1
σ−1
g
(
ϕ∗I
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗I
) [k2 (ϕ∗D) −Λα+1α ]−(α+ 1α
)
(σ− 1)
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
ϕ∗D
,
where ∂ϕ
∗
DI
∂ϕ∗D
=
[(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
fD
] 1
σ−1
= Λ
1
σ−1 .
Define j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗D
)]
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
, and j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗DI
)]
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
which
are non-negative.
Then the derivative and elasticity of j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
are
j′1 (ϕ
∗
D) = −
(σ− 1)
[
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
+ 1
]
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗D)] < 0,
j′1
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j1
(
ϕ∗D
) = −(σ− 1)[1+ 1
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −(σ− 1) ,
and
j′3 (ϕ
∗
D) = −g (ϕ
∗
DI)Λ
1
σ−1
Λ
α+1
α − θ (α+ 1) (σ− 1)
k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
ϕ∗D
[1−G (ϕ∗DI)] < 0,
j′3
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j3
(
ϕ∗D
) = − g (ϕ∗DI)[
1−G
(
ϕ∗DI
)]Λ 1σ−1Λα+1α
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) ϕ∗D −(α+ 1α
)
(σ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ− 1) .
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Thus, j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to infinite. Furthermore,
it must be that lim
ϕ∗D→0
j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ and lim
ϕ∗D→0
j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ since
lim
ϕ∗D→0
k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞. Since j1 (ϕ∗D) and j3 (ϕ∗D) are decreasing from infinity to zero on
(0,∞),from the closed economy case, it follows that j2 (ϕ∗X (ϕ∗D)) does also monotonically
decrease from infinite to zero on the (0,∞) parameter space.
Therefore, the RHS of Equation A.6 is a monotonic decreasing function from infinity to
zero on the space (0,∞) that cuts the FE flat line from above identifying a unique cutoff
level ϕ∗D.
a.2.3 Intermediate Economy
productivity distribution and weighted averages
Let us denote by µD (ϕ), and µXI (ϕ) respectively, the productivity distribution of
domestic producers, and active innovators and exporters prior to innovation.
µD (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
G(ϕXI)−G(ϕD)
, ϕXI > ϕ > ϕD;
0 , otherwise;
µXI (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕXI)
, ϕ > ϕXI;
0 , otherwise;
The distributions µD (ϕ), and µXI (ϕ) are not affected by the simultaneous entry and
exit since the successful entrants and failing incumbents draw their productivity level
from the common distribution µ (ϕ) .
Let ϕ˜ =
[∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ (ϕ)dϕ
] 1
(σ−1) and ϕ˜X =
[∫∞
ϕXI
ϕσ−1µXI (ϕ)dϕ
] 1
(σ−1) denote the
average productivity levels of, respectively, all firms and exporting firms only prior to
innovation. Then the weighted productivity average that reflects the combined market
share of all firms can be defined as
ϕ˜t =
{
1
Mt
[
Mϕ˜σ−1 +nMX
(
τ−1ϕ˜X
)σ−1]} 1σ−1
.
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And let ϕ˜XI =
[∫∞
ϕXI
(
ϕσ−1
) (α+1)
α µDI (ϕ)dϕ
] α
(α+1)
1
(σ−1)
represent the average
productivity exporter innovators get from innovation.
aggregate variables
Denote by mXI and mD respectively the mass of active innovators and exporters, and
non-innovators and non-exporters present in the economy,
mXI =
1−G (ϕXI)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
mD =
G (ϕXI) −G (ϕD)
1−G (ϕD)
M;
with M being the mass of incumbent firms in the economy, MI = mXI the number of
firms that perform innovation activities and MX = mXI the number of firms performing
exporting activities. The total number of varieties sold in the economy (by symmetry) will
be Mt =M+nMX.
It can be shown that the aggregates will take the following expressions
− Aggregate Price Index
P1−σ = Mt [pD (ϕ˜t)]
1−σ
+ MIzD (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
[
pD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)]1−σ
.
− Aggregate Production
Qρ = Mt [qD (ϕ˜t)]
ρ
+ MIzD (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
[
qD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)]ρ
.
− Aggregate Revenue
R =MtrD (ϕ˜t) +MIzD (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α rD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)
.
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− Aggregate Profits
Π = Mt
rD (ϕ˜t)
σ
−MfD −nMXfX −MIfI
+MI
(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α α
(
1
α+ 1
)α+1
α
(
rD (ϕ˜XI)
σ
)α+1
α
. (A.7)
a.2.3.1 Intermediate Equilibrium
proof of Proposition 4 , part ii
There exist a single cutoff ϕ∗XI that solves Equation 1.19
Proof. The proof is divided in three sections
First, I show that the LHS of Equation 1.19 is positive with respect to the productivity
parameter. piXI (ϕXI) − piD (ϕXI) > 0
(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α α
(
1
α+1
)α+1
α
[(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1
]α+1
α
+nτ1−σ
(
R(Pρ)σ−1
σ
)
ϕσ−1−nfX−nfI> 0;
C1
(
ϕσ−1
)α+1
α +C2ϕ
σ−1 −nfX − fI > 0;
∂LHS
∂ϕ
= C1
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ− 1)ϕ(
α+1
α )(σ−1)−1 +C2 (σ− 1)ϕ
σ−2 > 0.
Secondly, I show that piXI (ϕD) − piD (ϕD) < 0, otherwise the firm would choose to
export and innovate instead of being indifferent between innovating or not while staying
in the domestic market.
piXI (ϕD) − piD (ϕD) < 0;(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α α
(
fD
α+ 1
) α
α+1
+nτ1−σfD −nfX − fI < 0.
It holds that piXI (ϕD) − piD (ϕD) < 0 if:
τσ−1fX >
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
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(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) +
[(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α − 1
]
nτ1−σ
fI > τ
σ−1fX.
proof of Proposition 4 , part i
Equation 1.18 and Equation 1.19 along with the Free Entry condition (Equation 1.20)
completely determine the equilibrium and the productivity cutoffs. Rearrange the FE
conveniently for the characterizing of the equilibrium as a function of ϕ∗D
δfE = [1−G (ϕ
∗
D)]pi
δfE = fDj1 (ϕ
∗
D) +nτ
1−σfDj2 (ϕ
∗
X (ϕ
∗
D)) − [1−G (ϕ
∗
XI)]nfX (A.8)
+α
(
fD
α+ 1
)α+1
α (
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α j3 (ϕ
∗
D) − [1−G (ϕ
∗
XI)] fI.
where j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
,
j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
(
ϕ˜x
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1 [
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
)]
,
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜XI
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1]α+1α [
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
)]
.
Proof.
Assume the parameter restrictions
[
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α −1
]
nτ1−σ
fI +
(
fI
α
) α
α+1
(α+ 1) > τσ−1fX and(
fI
α
) α
α+1 (α+1)
(1+nτ1−σ)
> τσ−1fX hold, then the Intermediate Equilibrium exists and is unique. I
shall proof that the RHS of equation (A.8) is decreasing in ϕ∗D on the domain
(
ϕ∗D,∞),
so that ϕ∗D is uniquely determined by the intersection of the latter curve with the flat line
δfE in the
(
ϕ∗D,∞) space.
Let k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1
− 1
]
,and k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
(
ϕ˜X
(
ϕ∗X
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1 , then
k′1 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g
(
ϕ∗D
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗D
)k1 (ϕ∗D) − (σ− 1) [k1 (ϕ∗D)+ 1]ϕ∗D ,
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k′2 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g
(
ϕ∗XI
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
) [k2 (ϕ∗D) −(ϕXIϕD
)σ−1]
−
(σ− 1) k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
ϕ∗D
.
Similarly, k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[(
ϕ˜XI
(
ϕ∗D
)
/ϕ∗D
)σ−1]α+1α , thus
k′3 (ϕ
∗
D) =
g
(
ϕ∗XI
)
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
)
k3 (ϕ∗D) −
(
ϕσ−1XI
ϕσ−1D
)α+1
α
 ∂ϕ∗XI
∂ϕ∗D
−
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ− 1)
k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
ϕ∗D
.
Define j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗D
)]
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
, and j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
)]
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
and
j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
=
[
1−G
(
ϕ∗XI
)]
k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
which are non-negative.
Then the derivative and elasticity of j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
, j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
are
j′1
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j1
(
ϕ∗D
) = −(σ− 1)[1+ 1
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −(σ− 1) ,
j′2
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j2
(
ϕ∗D
) = g(ϕXI)
1−G(ϕXI)
(
ϕXI
ϕD
)σ−1
∂ϕXI
∂ϕD
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) − (σ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −(σ− 1) ,
j′3
(
ϕ∗D
) ·ϕ∗D
j3
(
ϕ∗D
) = − g (ϕ∗DI)[
1−G
(
ϕ∗DI
)]Λ 1σ−1Λα+1α
k2
(
ϕ∗D
) ϕ∗D −(α+ 1α
)
(σ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 and bounded away of it
< −
(
α+ 1
α
)
(σ− 1) .
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Thus, j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
, j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to infinite.
It must be that lim
ϕ∗D→0
j1
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k1
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞, lim
ϕ∗D→0
j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ since
lim
ϕ∗D→0
k2
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ and lim
ϕ∗D→0
j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞ since lim
ϕ∗D→0
k3
(
ϕ∗D
)
= ∞. Then j1 (ϕ∗D),
j2
(
ϕ∗D
)
and j3
(
ϕ∗D
)
, monotonically decrease from infinite to zero on the (0,∞) parameter
space.
Therefore, the RHS of Equation A.8 is a monotonic decreasing function from infinity to
zero on the space (0,∞) that cuts the FE flat line from above identifying a unique cutoff
level ϕ∗D.
a.3 proof of trade effects on innovation
proof of Proposition 5 In the low cost trade equilibrium, if productivity draws are
distributed according to a Pareto distribution, then the proportion of firms doing innovation
activities rises with respect to Autarky
(
ϕAUTDI > ϕ
LCT
XI
)
.
Proof.
Use Equation 1.6 and Equation 1.22 to getϕ
A
DI
ϕTXI
=
(
1+ τ1−σ
) 1
σ−1 ϕ
A
D
ϕTD
.
The FE conditions in autarky and free trade give us the following relationship between
profits and cutoffspi
A
piT
=
(
ϕAD
ϕTD
)θ
Hence, we need to show that
(
1+ τ1−σ
) θ
σ−1 piA > piT , from where it follows that ϕADI >
ϕTXI.
Using Equation A.1 and Equation A.5, we can express piA, and piT as
piA = AfD +B
(
1
Λ
) θ
σ−1
,
piT = AfD +B
(
1+ τ1−σ
Λ
) θ
σ−1
+AfX
(
fD
fXτσ−1
) θ
σ−1
,
where A = σ−1
θ−(σ−1) and B =
(
(α+1α )(σ−1)
θ−(α+1α )(σ−1)
)
fI.
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Thus
(
1+ τ1−σ
) θ
σ−1 piA > piT
↪→ fD
[(
1+ τ1−σ
) θ
σ−1 − 1
]
> fX
(
fD
fXτσ−1
) θ
σ−1
↪→
[(
1+ τ1−σ
) θ
σ−1 − 1
]
> τθ
(
fD
fX
) θ
− (σ−1)σ−1
From the parameter restriction we know that 1 > fD
fXτσ−1
, then it follows that 1 >(
fD
fXτσ−1
)θ−(σ−1)
σ−1 ⇒ τ1−σ >
(
fD
fX
) θ
σ−1
τ−θ then:
(
1+ τ1−σ
) θ
σ−1 > 1+ τ1−σ > 1+
(
fD
fX
) θ
σ−1
τ−θ.
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b.1 aggregate productivity
In what follows I show that the output of the economy can be expressed as a function of
the number of workers in the economy, their productivity and the elasticity of substitution
and that Equation 2.1 is the general form of such expression in the open economy. For the
proof I use the facts that in equilibrium L = R, that the budget constraint is PQ = R and
the price rule given by Equation 1.8.
low cost innovation equilibrium
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +M
I
tzD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α
rD
((
ϕ˜It
)α+1
α
)
= M
(
σ
σ− 1
)1−σ
QPσ
{∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+nτ1−σ
∫∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α ∫ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α (
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ
 .
Then,
L =
(
σ
σ− 1
)
QM
1
1−σ
{∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+nτ1−σ
∫∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α (
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ

1
1−σ
.
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And
Q = ρ
[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
LCIΨLCIINN
)] 1
σ−1 L, (B.1)
where ΨLCIINN =
(
ΨDI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α ΨXI
)
, ILCI = zD (ϕDI)
(
1
ϕσ−1DI
) 1
α
,
ΨD =
∫ϕXI
ϕD
ϕ(σ−1)µ(ϕ)dϕ, ΨX =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)µ(ϕ)dϕ,
ΨDI =
∫ϕXI
ϕDI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ and ΨXI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ.
intermediate equilibrium
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +mXI
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
rD
(
(ϕ˜XI)
α+1
α
)
= M
(
σ
σ− 1
)1−σ
QPσ
{∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+nτ1−σ
∫∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1+nτ1−σ
) ∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ
 .
Then,
L =
(
σ
σ− 1
)
QM
1
1−σ
{∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+nτ1−σ
∫∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
+ zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α (
1+ τ1−σ
) ∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ

1
1−σ
.
And
Q = ρ
[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1+nτ(1−σ)
)
ΨX + I
IE
(
1+ τ1−σ
)
ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1
L, (B.2)
where IIE = zX (ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
, ΨD =
∫ϕXI
ϕD
ϕ(σ−1)µ(ϕ)dϕ,
ΨX =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)µ(ϕ)dϕ and ΨXI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ.
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low cost trade equilibrium
R = MtrD (ϕ˜t) +mXI
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
zX(ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
rD
(
ϕ˜
(α+1α )
XI
)
= M
(
σ
σ− 1
)1−σ
QPσ
{∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+nτ1−σ
∫∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
+
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
zX(ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α ∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ
 .
Then,
L =
(
σ
σ− 1
)
QM
1
1−σ
{∫∞
ϕD
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ+nτ1−σ
∫∞
ϕX
ϕσ−1µ(ϕ)dϕ
+
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
zX(ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α ∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ

1
1−σ
.
And
Q = ρ
[
M
(
ΨD + (1+nτ
1−σ)ΨX + I
LCT
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1 L, (B.3)
where ILCT = zX(ϕXI)
(
1
ϕσ−1XI
) 1
α
,ΨD =
∫ϕX
ϕD
ϕ(σ−1)µ(ϕ)dϕ,
ΨX =
∫∞
ϕX
ϕ(σ−1)µ(ϕ)dϕ and ΨXI =
∫∞
ϕXI
ϕ(σ−1)(
α+1
α )µ(ϕ)dϕ.
b.2 proof of Proposition 6
low cost innovation equilibrium
ΨLCI =
[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
LCI
(
ΨDI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α ΨXI
))] 1
σ−1
.
∆logΨLCI = −sX∆log(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
−
(
α+ 1
α
)(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCI∆log(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporters ′ Innovation
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+
1
σ− 1
 ∆log(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Effect
+ sD∆log (ΨD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Market
+
(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sX∆log (ΨX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Market
+ sII
LCI∆log(ILCI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
+ ILCI [(sI − sXI)∆log(ΨDI)∆+ sXIlog(ΨXI)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
 .
Proof. Recall that for every x ∈ R
∆x
x
= ∆log(x).
Take logs of ΨLCI
log
(
ΨLCI
)
= 1σ−1
[
log(M) + log
(
ΨD +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
LCI
(
ΨDI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α ΨXI
))]
.
And derivatives
∆logΨ =
1
σ− 1
[
∆log(M) +∆logΨˆ
]
∆logΨˆ =
1
Ψˆ
[
∆ΨD +∆
(
1+ τ1−σ
)
ΨX +
(
1+ τ1−σ
)
∆ΨX
+ ∆
[(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α
]
IΨI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α ∆IΨI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)α+1
α I∆ΨI
]
.
Define the share of domestic firms excluding innovation sD = ΨDΨˆ , the share of export
firms excluding innovation sX = nτ
1−σΨX
Ψˆ
, the share of innovation activities sI = ΨINNΨˆ and
the share of exporters innovation activities sXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)
α+1
α ΨXI
Ψˆ
. Then, the variation in
productivity can be decomposed in the following terms:
− Direct Effect on Exports = −sX∆log(τ)
− Direct Effect on Exporters’ Innovation
= −
(
α+1
α
) (
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCI∆log(τ)
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− Indirect Entry Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
∆log(M)
− Indirect Domestic Market Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sD∆log (ΨD)
− Indirect Export Market Effect =
(
1
σ−1
) (
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sX∆log (ΨX)
− Indirect Extensive Margin Innovation Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sII
LCI∆log(ILCI)
− Indirect Intensive Margin Innovation Effect
=
(
1
σ−1
)
ILCI (sI − sXI)∆log(ΨDI) +
(
1
σ−1
)
ILCIsXI∆log(ΨXI)
intermediate equilibrium
ΨIE =
[
M
(
ΨD +
(
1+nτ(1−σ)
)
ΨX + I
IE
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1
.
∆logΨIE = −sX∆log(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
−
(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
sXII
IE∆log(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporters ′ Innovation
+
1
σ− 1
 ∆log(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Effect
+ sD∆log (ΨD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Market
+
(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sX∆log (ΨX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Market
+ sXII
IE∆log(IIE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
+ IIEsXIlog(ΨI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
 .
Proof. Recall that for every x ∈ R
∆x
x
= ∆log(x).
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Take logs of ΨIE
log
(
ΨIE
)
=
1
σ− 1
[
log(M) + log
(
ΨD +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
IE
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨI
)]
.
And derivatives
∆logΨ =
1
σ− 1
[
∆log(M) +∆logΨˆ
]
.
∆logΨˆ =
1
Ψˆ
[
∆ΨD +∆
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨX +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
∆ΨX
+ ∆
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
IΨI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
∆IΨI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
I∆ΨI
]
.
Define the share of domestic firms excluding innovation sD = ΨDΨˆ , the share of export
firms excluding innovation sX = nτ
1−σΨX
Ψˆ
and the share of exporters innovation activities
sXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)ΨI
Ψˆ
. Then, the variation in productivity can be decomposed in the
following terms:
− Direct Effect on Exports = −sX∆log(τ)
− Direct Effect on Exporters’ Innovation = −
(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
sXII
IE∆log(τ)
− Indirect Entry Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
∆log(M)
− Indirect Domestic Market Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sD∆log (ΨD)
− Indirect Export Market Effect =
(
1
σ−1
) (
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sX∆log (ΨX)
− Indirect Extensive Margin Innovation Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sXII
IE∆log(IIE)
− Indirect Intensive Margin Innovation Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sXII
IE∆log(ΨXI)
low cost trade equilibrium
ΨLCT =
[
M
(
ΨD + (1+nτ
1−σ)ΨX + I
LCT
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨXI
)] 1
σ−1 .
∆logΨLCT = −sX∆log(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
−sXII
LCT∆log(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exporters ′ Innovation
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+
1
σ− 1
 ∆log(M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entry Effect
+ sD∆log (ΨD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Market
+
(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sX∆log (ΨX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Export Market
+
(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCT∆log(ILCT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
+
(
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCT log(ΨI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin

Proof. Recall that for every x ∈ R
∆x
x
= ∆log(x).
Take logs of ΨLCT
logΨLCT =
1
σ− 1
[
log(M) + log
(
ΨD +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨX + I
LCT
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨI
)]
.
And derivatives
∆logΨ =
1
σ− 1
[
∆log(M) +∆logΨˆ
]
.
∆logΨˆ =
1
Ψˆ
[
∆ΨD +∆
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
ΨX +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
∆ΨX
+ ∆
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
IΨI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
∆IΨI +
(
1+nτ1−σ
)
I∆ΨI
]
.
Define the share of domestic firms excluding innovation sD = ΨDΨˆ , the share of export
firms excluding innovation sX = nτ
1−σΨX
Ψˆ
and the share of exporters innovation activities
sXI =
(1+nτ1−σ)ΨXI
Ψˆ
. Then, the variation in productivity can be decomposed in the
following terms:
− Direct Effect on Exports = −sX∆log(τ)
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− Direct Effect on Exporters’ Innovation = −
(
nτ1−σ
1+nτ1−σ
)
sXII
LCT∆log(τ)
− Indirect Entry Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
∆log(M)
− Indirect Domestic Market Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sD∆log (ΨD)
− Indirect Export Market Effect =
(
1
σ−1
) (
1+nτ1−σ
nτ1−σ
)
sX∆log (ΨX)
− Indirect Extensive Margin Innovation Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sXII
LCT∆log(ILCT )
− Indirect Intensive Margin Innovation Effect =
(
1
σ−1
)
sXII
LCT∆log(ΨXI)
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The production function for each differentiated product is given by a Cobb Douglas
function of firm TFP, capital and labor:
Ysi = AsiK
αs
si L
1−αs
si .
Since there are distortions affecting the production of firms, the profits of a firm are given
by:
pisi = (1− τYsi)PsiYsi −wLsi − (1+ τKsi)RKsi.
Profit maximization yields the standard optimal price and capital-labor ratio:
Psi =
σ
σ− 1
(
R
αs
)αs ( w
1−αs
)1−αs (1+ τKsi)αs
Asi (1− τYsi)
,
Ksi
Lsi
=
αs
1−αs
· w
R (1+ τKsi)
.
The marginal revenue product of labor is proportional to revenue per worker:
MRPLsi = Psi
∂Ysi
∂Lsi
= (1−αs)
PsiYsi
Lsi
=
(
σ
σ− 1
)
w
1− τYsi
.
The marginal revenue product of capital is proportional to the revenue-capital ratio:
MRPKsi = Psi
∂Ysi
∂Ksi
= αs
PsiYsi
Ksi
=
(
σ
σ− 1
)
R(1+ τKsi)
1− τYsi
.
To derive Ks and Ls, first we derive the aggregate demand for capital and labor in a
sector by aggregating the firm-level demands for the two factor inputs. Then, we combine
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the aggregate demand for the factor inputs in each sector with the allocation of total
expenditure across sectors.
Ls ≡
Ms∑
i=1
Lsi = L
(1−αs)θs/MRPLs∑S
s ′=1(1−αs ′)θs ′/MRPLs ′
,
Ks ≡
Ms∑
i=1
Ksi = K
αsθs/MRPKs∑S
s ′=1 αs ′θs ′/MRPKs ′
,
where
MRPLs
4
=
w∑Ms
i=1(1− τYsi)
PsiYsi
PsYs
MRPKs
4
=
R∑Ms
i=1
1−τYsi
1+τKsi
PsiYsi
PsYs
The TFPRsi is defined as follows:
TFPRsi =
σ
σ− 1
(
MRPKsi
αs
)αs (MRPLsi
1−αs
)1−αs
=
σ
σ− 1
(
R
αs
)αs ( w
1−αs
)1−αs (1+ τKsi)αs
1− τYsi
.
Then,
TFPRs
4
=
σ
σ− 1
 R
αs
(∑Ms
i=1
1−τYsi
1+τKsi
PsiYsi
PsYs
)
αs  w(
(1−αs)
∑Ms
i=1(1− τYsi)
PsiYsi
PsYs
)
1−αs
=
σ
σ− 1
(
MRPKs
αs
)αs (
MRPLs
1−αs
)1−αs
.
Using these expressions, we can derive Equation 3.5:
TFPs
4
=
Ys
Kαss L
1−αs
S
=
[∑Ms
i
(
AsiK
αs
si L
1−αs
si
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(∑Ms
i Lsi
)1−αs (∑Ms
i Ksi
)αs
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=
[∑Ms
i
(
Asi
1−τYsi
(1+τKsi)
αs
)σ−1] 1σ−1
(∑Ms
i
1−τYsi
1+τKsi
PsiYsi
PsYs
)αs (∑Ms
i (1− τYsi)
PsiYsi
PsYs
)1−αs
=
[
Ms∑
i
(
Asi
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1] 1σ−1
.
133

B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Alessandria, G. and H. Choi (2011). Establishment heterogeneity, exporter dynamics, and
the effects of trade liberalization. Working Papers (11-19).
Altomonte, C. and T. Aquilante (2012). The EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-Unicredit Dataset. Bruegel
Working Paper.
Altomonte, C., T. Aquilante, and G. Ottaviano (2012). The triggers of competitiveness:
The EFIGE cross-country report. Blueprint (17).
Altomonte, C., G. B. Navaretti, F. di Mauro, and G. Ottaviano (2011). Assessing
competitiveness: How firm-level data can help. Policy Contributions (643).
Altomonte, C., M. Nicolini, A. Rungi, and L. Ogliari (2010). Assessing the competitive
behaviour of firms in the single market: A micro-based approach. European Economy -
Economic Papers (409).
Antràs, P., R. Segura-Cayuela, and D. Rodríguez-Rodríguez (2010). Firms in international
trade, with an application to spain. In SERIEs Invited Lecture at the XXXV Simposio de la
Asociación Española de Economía.
Arkolakis, C., A. Costinot, and A. Rodriguez-Clare (2012). New trade models, same old
gains? American Economic Review 102(1), 94–130.
Atkeson, A. and A. T. Burstein (2010). Innovation, Firm Dynamics, and International
Trade. Journal of Political Economy 118(3), pp. 433–484.
Bajona, C., M. J. Gibson, T. J. Kehoe, and K. J. R. and (2008). Trade liberalization growth
and productivity. 2008 Meeting Papers (789).
Baldwin, R. E. and F. Robert-Nicoud (2008). Trade and growth with heterogeneous firms.
Journal of International Economics 74(1), 21–34.
135
bibliography
Barba-Navaretti, G., M. Bugamelli, F. Schivardi, C. Altomonte, D. Horgos, and
D. Maggioni (2011). The Global Operations of European Firms - The second EFIGE policy
report. Number 581 in Blueprints. Bruegel.
Bernard, A. B. and J. Bradford Jensen (1999). Exceptional exporter performance: cause,
effect, or both? Journal of International Economics 47(1), 1–25.
Bernard, A. B., J. B. Jensen, S. J. Redding, and P. K. Schott (2011). The empirics of firm
heterogeneity and international trade. CEP Discussion Papers (dp1084).
Bernard, A. B., S. J. Redding, and P. K. Schott (2007). Comparative Advantage and
Heterogeneous Firms. Review of Economic Studies 74(1), 31–66.
Boone, J., H. van der Wiel, and J. C. van Ours (2007). How (not) to measure competition.
CEPR Discussion Papers (6275).
Broda, C. and D. E. Weinstein (2006). Globalization and the Gains from Variety. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2), 541–585.
Burstein, A. and M. J. Melitz (2011). Trade liberalization and firm dynamics. NBER
Working Papers (16960).
Bustos, P. (2011). Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Evidence
on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms. American Economic Review 101(1),
304–40.
Chaney, T. (2008). Distorted gravity: The intensive and extensive margins of international
trade. American Economic Review 98(4), 1707–21.
Clerides, S. K., S. Lach, and J. R. Tybout (1998). Is learning by exporting important?
micro-dynamic evidence from colombia, mexico, and morocco. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113(3), 903–947.
Costantini, J. A. and M. J. Melitz (2008). The Organization of Firms in a global economy,
Chapter in The Dynamics of Firm Level Adjustment to Trade Liberalization. Harvard
University Press.
Crespo, A. (2012). Trade, innovation and productivity: A quantitative analysis of Europe.
Working Paper EFIGE (62).
136
bibliography
di Giovanni, J. and A. A. Levchenko (2009). International trade and aggregate fluctuations
in granular economies. Working Papers (585).
Felipe, J. and U. Kumar (2011). Unit labor costs in the eurozone: The competitiveness
debate again. Economics Working Paper Archive (651).
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger, and C. Syverson (2008). Reallocation, firm turnover, and
efficiency: Selection on productivity or profitability? American Economic Review 98(1),
394–425.
Griliches, Z. (1979). Issues in assessing the contribution of research and development to
productivity growth. Bell Journal of Economics 10(1), 92–116.
Helpman, E., M. J. Melitz, and S. R. Yeaple (2004). Export versus fdi with heterogeneous
firms. American Economic Review 94(1), 300–316.
Hsieh, C.-T. and P. J. Klenow (2009). Misallocation and manufacturing tfp in china and
india. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(4), 1403–1448.
Klette, T. J. and S. Kortum (2004). Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation. Journal of
Political Economy 112(5), 986–1018.
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade.
American Economic Review 70(5), 950–59.
Krugman, P. (1994). Competitiveness: A dangerous obsession. Technical report, Foreign
Affairs, vol 73(2).
Lentz, R. and D. T. Mortensen (2008). An Empirical Model of Growth through Product
Innovation. Econometrica 76(6), 1317–1373.
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity. Econometrica 71(6), 1695–1725.
Navas-Ruiz, A. and D. Sala (2007). Technology adoption and the selection effect of trade.
mimeo.
Porter, M. (2005). What is competitiveness. Technical report, Notes on Globalization and
Strategy, IESE.
137
bibliography
Porter, M. E. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. Free Press, New York.
Rubini, L. (2011). Innovation and the elasticity of trade volumes to tariff reductions. MPRA
Paper (21484).
Rubini, L., K. Desmet, F. Piguillem, and A. Crespo (2012). Breaking down the barriers to
firm growth in Europe: The fourth EFIGE policy report. Number 744 in Bruegel Blueprints.
Bruegel.
Stähler, F., H. Raff, and N. Van Long (2007). The Effects of Trade Liberalization on
Productivity and Welfare: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity, R&D and Market Structure.
Economics Working Papers.
Vannoorenberghe, G. (2008). Globalization, heterogeneous firms and endogenous
investment. mimeo.
Vives, X. (2008). Innovation and competitive pressure. The Journal of Industrial
Economics 56(3), pp. 419–469.
Yeaple, S. R. (2005). A simple model of firm heterogeneity, international trade, and wages.
Journal of International Economics 65(1), 1–20.
138

